You’ve Got Protest:
The Effectiveness of the Internet As an Implement of Student Protest Movements

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INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, the use of the Internet has exploded worldwide. Consumers have discovered and developed innumerable uses for this innovation, and so it has affected economies greatly. Furthermore, because of its transnational nature, this system has sped the process of globalization. Because of its pervasiveness, though, the Internet has not remained only a tool for commerce, entertainment, or research. Instead, it has begun to seep into political processes as well. One aspect of this spread is the adoption of the Internet by student protest movements worldwide to further their causes through both internal (e.g., organizational) and external (e.g. reporting) uses. This appropriation of the new technology by student protesters is perhaps advantageous because of its relatively low cost, generally a requirement for students, and overall the Internet has proven very useful for protest movements. However, the relative effectiveness of the Internet for student social movements is tied directly to the type of regime of the movement’s host country. A review of the relevant existing body of literature and an analysis of four case studies, ranging from 2005-2009, will further this argument.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Before the 1960s, scholarly studies of social movements generally regarded them as dangerous anomalies carried out by the few – academics did not consider them legitimate forms of political action. However, beginning in the 1960s, for the first time in contemporary Western history, academics began to side en masse with politically marginalized protestors because of the American civil rights movement. With this
change, academics began to consider social movements more seriously (Goodwin and Jasper 5). Furthermore, at this time social movements worldwide established themselves as a regular facet of political culture and have continued as such into present-day (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1). Because of the proved tenacity and efficacy of this form of political action, scholars also began to regard the form seriously out of necessity.

The resulting theories on social movements developed in waves. The first centered on the economic approach of rational choice theory, which regarded individuals engaged in protest as rational thinkers – self-interested actors who weighed the costs and benefits of their actions. A later offshoot of rational choice theory championed by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, resource mobilization theory, applied the same rational, economic logic to social movement organizations (Goodwin and Jasper 6). The second theoretical wave, pioneered by Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, and Sidney Tarrow in the late 1970s and early 1980s (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 2), moved from economic to political thinking by focusing on the interactions between social movements and their respective states. In this political process theory, social movements are still viewed as rational actors, but they are considered as part of a nation’s political sphere; social movements are thus non-institutional components of the political process. Under political process theory, scholars identify political opportunities – signified by changes in the relevant political climate that either lessen the negative consequences of protesting or increase the likelihood of its success – as keys to the emergence of social movements. In the late 1980s, the third wave of social movement theory moved focus from the political to the cultural. Within this approach, the concepts of framing (painting issues in such a way as to be enticing to potential participants) and collective identity (attraction to a
movement due to identification with a larger group) rose in importance. Finally, with the rise of international connectivity in the past two decades, scholars have begun to research the transnational aspects of some social movements, but this approach has yet to be fully explored (Goodwin and Jasper 6).

With the 1996 publication of *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, leaders in the field McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald attempted to engender a synthesized approach on social movements that would draw from all the various involved disciplines (such as political science, economics, sociology, and history) and theories constructed since the 1960s. The authors believed this to be possible because, according to them, the disparate fields all focus on the same three factors to analyze the emergence and dynamics of social movements – *political opportunities*, *mobilizing structures*, and *framing processes* (2).

McAdam defines *political opportunities* as “the opportunities afforded insurgents by the shifting institutional structure and ideological disposition of those in power,” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 23). When the reigning regime is weak or ideologically aligned with a movement, the movement is more likely to be successful, and *vice versa*. McAdam addresses three issues that he believes complicate the theoretical concept of political opportunities. First, he stresses the importance of distinguishing political opportunities from “other facilitative conditions” (25). Because many factors contribute to the emergence and progression of social movements, McAdam argues that these factors should be defined as narrowly as possible to prevent their overlap in analysis. He particularly points to the dangers of combining political opportunities with cultural opportunities, framing of opportunities portrayed by the
media, and other resources for movements (within the resource mobilization framework) (25-26). Second, McAdam seeks to define the dimensions he believes should be included in the concept of political opportunity. His list includes the following:

1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite assignments that typically undergird a policy
3. The presence or absence of elite allies
4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression (27)

Third, McAdam stresses the necessity for future theorists identifying the specific dependent variable they intend to study through the lens of political opportunity, as many possible effects exist. These include the timing of the movement’s emergence, the results of the movement, and the movement form (institutional or noninstitutional) (29-30).

McCarthy defines mobilizing structures as “ways of engaging in collective action,” including the organizational forms, formal or informal, that lend themselves to the emergence of a movement and the protest repertoires that encompass all of the culturally, historically, and politically defined methods of protest available to the movement (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 141). He particularly focuses on the “varieties of enabling institutional configurations,” ranging from the least formal (families and friends), to the most formal (specific social movement organizations) (141-144). Additionally, McCarthy introduces Steven Buechler’s concept of the social movement community, which operates in parallel to a social movement organization but through informal networks rather than formal structures (143). All of these formal and informal structures, generally stable in the short-run (147), build the networks through which people relate to one another and can develop common interests and goals. These connections are crucial for the development of social movements. In an effort to better understand the role of
mobilizing structures, McCarthy identifies three factors that influence the type of structure adopted by movements. First, the contextual environment of the developing movement matters (147-149). As McCarthy writes, “Collective actors, probably most often, adopt mobilizing structural forms that are known to them from direct experience.” External factors and purposive innovations also play a role, however (148). Second, framing processes, discussed below, influence the adoption of mobilizing structures. Actors must frame their choice of structure in ways that portray the capability of the movement to produce desired change, and the frames must target both internal audiences (adherents) and external audiences (potential recruits and opposition) (149). Third, political opportunities shape the choice of mobilizing structure because different opportunities may lend themselves to different structures (150).

In the last section of *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, Zald defines framing processes as the use of “specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues… to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action” (262). He also explores six areas of societal contexts that he regards as requisite to fully understanding framing processes (266). First, Zald argues that, because social movements exist within and affect larger society, they draw upon the dominant “cultural stock” for ideas as vague as the culture-specific definitions of various relationships and individual rights and as specific as methods of protest and organizational frameworks of movements. Thus, social movements often co-opt key ideas regarding their emergence and dynamics from a repertoire of contention developed by previous movements within the society (266-267). Second, “cultural contradictions,” or incongruities among societal premises (such as pro-nuclear power advocates and nuclear
disasters) can spur emergence or mobilization of social movements because the contradictions raise clear distinctions among two or more lines of thought, one of which often stems from government (268-269). Third, framing is generally "strategic," meaning that movement leaders address framing processes directly and purposefully in the hopes of bringing more people to their cause (269). Fourth, framing is competitive both externally and internally; externally, governments, countermovements, the media, and others may try to frame an issue differently than a social movement will, and internally, different proponents of a movement may attempt to frame issues disparately (269-270). Fifth, the role of the media in such external competition is significant, as media outlets rarely approach topics objectively. Furthermore, as technology continues to develop, more and more new media forms arise (270). Finally, in a reversal of the first area of understanding, social movements also contribute to the dominant "cultural stock," leaving behind changed policy, symbols, tactics, etc. (270-271).

Besides evaluating the interplay of the preceding factors (political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and framing processes), another type of divisional approach to the theoretical study of social movements is studying them through different levels of analysis. Whereas the authors of *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* address social movements externally and on the organizational level (often by studying movements themselves), other researchers choose to study movements internally and through their individual members (by studying individuals and their specific groups within movements). For example, in 1990 Eric Hirsch studied a student protest both internally and on the individual-level and in so doing developed a theory of internal "group-level processes" (Hirsch 243). He first rejects collective behavior theory because
it falsely paints movements as disorganized, and then he rejects rational choice theory because it cannot explain why individuals are willing to accept the personal costs associated with joining protests (244, 252). Instead, Hirsch argues that protest movements are generally highly organized and that individuals are drawn into participation through persuasion by group-level processes that foster political solidarity, including consciousness-raising, collective empowerment, polarization, and collective decision-making (252, 243).

Consciousness-raising is the process by which members of a movement push for the formation of “an ideological commitment to the group cause and …[a belief] that only non-institutional means can further that cause” in potential newcomers (244). When new recruits see firsthand that movement members are prepared to take the risks implicit in protest movements, the resulting collective empowerment allows new members to feel like part of the whole (245). With contentious protests, polarization can develop between a movement and its target. This schism can dampen the chances of negotiation, but it can also increase group solidarity by encouraging participants to view their outcomes collectively and, thus, cooperate internally (245). Collective decision-making fosters further internal cooperation by allowing participants to take part in the assessment process (246).

Yet another method of distinguishing social movement theories and constructs is by dividing them into domestic and transnational/international approaches. McAdam, Zald, and Hirsch all focused on domestic social movements in the early 1990s. However, toward the end of that decade, increased interaction among states and their peoples,
known as globalization, forced theorists to seriously consider transnational and international social movements.

In their book *Activists Beyond Borders*, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink analyze **transnational advocacy networks**, or communication structures that foster interaction among activists from different states (Keck and Sikkink 1). The authors find that these networks operate similarly to the domestic social movements described by McAdam and Zald (6, 9), with both types affected by political opportunity and both utilizing framing processes (7, 2-3, 17). However, of course transnational advocacy networks (TANs) operate in domestic and international affairs concurrently (4), and thus must operate within different contexts and cultures at once. Like Hirsch, Keck and Sikkink reject rational choice theory (8-9), but they advocate the importance of information flow to network tenacity, rather than political solidarity (10, 18-22).

One trend the authors emphasize that is particularly relevant for this study is the so-called **“boomerang” effect**. When a domestic social movement seeks to change the structure or policies of its own government, the government in question is often predictably unreceptive. Thus, the domestic movement may appeal to other, more understanding states, in the hopes that these outside actors (perhaps through intergovernmental organizations) will apply pressure to change on their own government. This pattern forms one type of transnational network (12-13). Overall, the authors argue that TANs operate within a “blurring of domestic and international politics” (29) – a development massively accelerated by the creation of the Internet.

Writing in 1999, Jeffreay Ayres contended that the dawn of the Internet age signalled a shift in the operations of social movements; as he greeted readers,
“...welcome to contentious politics Internet-style, where the rules have changed and the ideas and tactics of protest diffuse quickly to the far ends of the globe,” (Ayres 133). Because actors in social movements are generally outsiders to government, they must employ noninstitutional tactics to further their causes. **Diffusion** is the dispersion of such noninstitutional tactics, or ideas and information in general, throughout a society (134). Ayres contends that the new cyber-diffusion of noninstitutional tactics differs from previous formulations in three ways: the dissemination occurs much more quickly – almost simultaneously; movements have to struggle to control it because of open access (135); and political borders are much less relevant (137-138). Furthermore, Ayres challenges McAdam’s formulation of political opportunity; he argues that the traditional model of political opportunity structures is state-centric (135), whereas contentious politics is becoming progressively more transnational because of the globalization of the world economy, which has only strengthened since the development of the Internet (135-136)

Not everyone agrees on the power of the Internet to aid social movements, however. Even Ayres fears that the eased flow of information could devolve into a “global electronic riot” (135). Andrew Shapiro attacks the potential of the Internet even more directly, though. He grants that the Internet can facilitate public dialogue through new communication channels and operates through a “decentralized” and “nonproprietary” structure in the United States and other Western democracies, all of which may lead to an increased equality among states, NGOs, and movements (14, 24). However, Shapiro argues that because states ultimately control many components of the technology – such as access, permissible content, and encryption – the freedom of the
Internet (and its potential to benefit social movements) is largely a whim of domestic governments (Shapiro 14-15, 18). Thus, though the potential for the Internet to propel social movements exists, it is in no way certain.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

"Totalitarian governments rule by brute force, and because they control the consensus worldview of those they rule. Tyranny, in other words, is a monologue. But as long as Twitter is up and running, there’s no such thing.”

(Grossman)

1. Variable Creation

This study aims to analyze the effectiveness of the Internet in furthering the causes of student protest movements worldwide. For these purposes, the dependent variable of this study is the effectiveness of the Internet in aiding student protest movements change some aspect of the host country’s national government. Building from Shapiro’s work, the independent variable of the study is the level of domestic government interference with the Internet. Thus, both variables operate within political process theory, as the social movements are analyzed through their roles within domestic political spheres. Both variables will be measured qualitatively through four separate case studies.

2. Theory

A. The theoretical framework of this study begins with regime type. According to this argument, whether liberal democracy or repressive autocracy, the regime type of a nation’s government affects the level of domestic government interference with the
Internet; the regime type and the level of government interference move in tandem. Thus, regime type is a conditional variable of the independent variable. (See Figure 1.) As noted by Shapiro, liberal democracies, which respond to popular opinion and observe political rights and civil liberties, are less likely to interfere with the Internet than more repressive regimes, which are not as responsive to their general publics (14-15, 18, 24).

**Figure 1**

B. How the independent variable (level of government interference) affects the dependent variable (effectiveness of Internet) is conditioned by political opportunity. Here the theory of this study diverges somewhat from Ayres's idea that social movements are generally becoming progressively more transnational with globalization. According to the theory of this study, because liberal democracies respond to their publics, social
movements attempting to affect these environments are less likely to expand outside of the country with their use of the Internet; goals can be achieved domestically. Thus, political opportunities arise through structural changes in the domestic government, namely elections. Conversely, political opportunities for social movements under unresponsive, repressive regimes arise through outlets to the outside world, specifically the Internet. Within countries under these regimes, applying pressure to domestic governments is not an effective method for social movements. Thus, these movements are more likely to use the Internet transnationally, appealing to foreign governments and non-governmental organizations in attempt to incite a boomerang effect, as outlined by Keck and Sikkink.\(^1\) Thus, political opportunity is a conditional variable affecting the interaction between the independent and dependent variable.

C. Lastly, the effectiveness of the Internet, or the dependent variable, directly affects the **mobilization structure** of the social movement that uses this tool. If the Internet appears to be an effective tool for a social movement, a social movement is more likely to begin using it. Additionally, if a social movement adopts the Internet into its **repertoire of contention**, then that adoption may affect the effectiveness of the tool: if a movement under a repressive regime begins to use the Internet to further its causes, then the government will be more likely to curtail use of the Internet, effectively squelching its effectiveness.

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\(^1\) The following is a further explanation of how the boomerang effect operates within this theoretical framework: Individuals within the social movement in Country A connect, via the Internet, with individuals in Country B, forming a type of social movement community or transnational advocacy network. If Country B is a democracy, then those individuals within it can appeal to their government to pressure Country A regarding the social movement.
All of the components of this theoretical framework will be further explored through the following set of four case studies: student involvement in the ongoing movement against mountaintop removal in United States; the 2006 student movement in Chile protesting government uses of copper windfall profits; student involvement in the 2009 protests in Iran; and the amplified government intervention into the Internet in China preceding the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests in 2009.

CASE STUDIES

1. United States

_Butter That Stinketh Not_

The first recorded American university protest occurred within the hallowed halls of Harvard in 1766 when students rose against the injustice of the dining hall’s inferior butter (Ness 1161-1162). With the reputed battle cry of “…give us we pray thee Butter that stinketh not,” those young Americans inaugurated a tradition of occasional subversion within that country’s system of higher education (Cohen 565). Since then, American college students have protested against poverty, racism, war, human rights abuses, and many other significant national and international issues. In the last decade, environmental concerns have captivated many American students, and the movement against mountaintop removal in Appalachia has benefited from this energy, securing a large youth following in the past several years.

This movement driven largely by youth involvement both echoes former American campaigns and strikes out on new ground. The students behind the push to end mountaintop removal utilize methods and tactics tried in decades past while also
expanding their efforts through today’s technology, namely the Internet. Though this movement sprawls through a loosely connected network of activists, all of these students share a fervent desire to end the practice of mountaintop removal mining.

*Appalachian Apocalypse*

America’s rural common people usually lose their battles. Their experience, then, is at odds with the dominant American national myth of triumph through virtue… (Ness 759)

America adores its Adirondacks and reveres the Rockies, while the Appalachian Mountains – with their impoverished and alienated population – are dismantled by coal moguls who dominate state politics and have little to prevent them from blasting the physical landscape to smithereens.

-Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.
(Kennedy, Jr. “A President Breaks Hearts in Appalachia.”)

The Appalachian landscape of rolling mountains and gentle valleys undoubtedly has shaped that region’s culture, nurturing a distinct connectedness to and dependence on nature (Evans, etc. 171). Naturally, then, the centuries-long ravaging of that landscape for industrial resources has been just as influential. Miners built the first recorded American coal mine outside of Richmond, Virginia in 1701, and Appalachia has never been the same since (Ciment 609). Today, American coal is a $21 billion industry, with a quarter of the world’s reserves found in the United States (610).

For a region historically plagued by poverty, the prospect of selling the rights to the minerals beneath their land for cash struck Appalachians in the late 19th century as a reasonable idea (Evans, etc. 174-175). However, this hope for prosperity proved overpowering, and by 1923 outsiders owned half of the state of West Virginia and 80% of its value in natural resources (Fox 20). Today, absentee owners still largely control the coal industry in Appalachia, and so for over a century the industry has operated as solely
profit-driven and has held little or no concern for local populations. Corporate owners have ignored vast health and environmental problems caused by coal mines and power plants, and in the past decade they have green-lighted the expansion of a type of coal mining that takes away the one boon for residents – jobs (16-17).

**Mountaintop removal mining**, as it is known, began on a small-scale in the 1970’s but saw a dramatic increase in the 1990’s. The spur for its growth was, ironically enough, the 1990 Clean Air Act, which sharply increased the demand for low-sulfur coal, the best of which is found under the surface of Appalachian mountains (18). Another catalyst was increased demand for low-cost electricity in the United States (17); industry leaders regard mountaintop removal as highly efficient because it is much cheaper than underground mining and also largely mechanized, thus requiring far fewer miners (Ciment 609).

Mountaintop removal as a process scars the land like no other type of coal mining. First, all trees are bulldozed, and the timber is generally not collected for lumber but forgotten. In this way, more than 400,000 acres of forest have already been destroyed (175-176). Then, explosives 10-100 times more powerful than those used in the Oklahoma City bombing are detonated to remove more than 500 hundred feet of mountain in order to access the coal seam (Fox 18). The resulting dust contains silica, among other toxic substances, and erupting shock waves can be felt miles away. Fly rock, or large boulders which fly from the site, cause even further damage and danger (Evans, etc. 175-176). An operator of the dragline, a piece of machinery towering over 200 feet tall and weighing 8 million pounds, then uses the apparatus to remove the exploded rock with a large shovel mechanism (Fox 18). Millions of tons of this
overburden are dumped over the sides of the mountain in a valley fill, polluting rivers and creeks and blocking their headwaters (Evans, etc. 176; Fox 19). The removal of trees and the disruption of natural drainage systems by valley fills increase the likelihood and dangers of flooding, while slurry, a byproduct of coal-washing which contains toxins and carcinogens, regularly seeps into groundwater from the large repositories in which it is stored (Evans, etc. 177). Despite all of this, coal companies pursue mountaintop removal because it moves more than double the amount of coal than underground mining in the same time and with fewer employees (Fox 19).

In large part because of layoffs due to mountaintop removal, the coal industry only provides about 2% of jobs in central Appalachia today. Thus, though companies are extracting more coal than ever, the profits do not benefit the region being ravaged. As Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., writes, “Coal is not an economic engine in the coalfields. It is an extraction engine,” (“A President Breaks Hearts in Appalachia”).

Because of both the environmental and economic pitfalls, most Americans oppose mountaintop removal, according to a 2008 poll. From likely voters provided with no information, 39% opposed mountaintop removal, 15% favored the practice, and 46% were unsure. After the 46% were provided a definition of mountaintop removal, 61% of that group then opposed the practice, with 16% favoring it and 23% still unsure (Ward). Those who oppose mountaintop removal hoped that the election of Barack Obama in November 2008 would herald the end of the mining method, but so far the Obama Administration has not met most expectations in this arena.

Late in President G.W. Bush’s second term, the White House relaxed rules banning the dumping of overburden within 100 feet of streams if such action was
“unavoidable” and if impacts were minimized (Eilperin). Those opposed to the practice largely expected the Obama Administration not only to tighten these rules but also ultimately to end the practice. However, a large blow arrived in February 2009 when the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond overturned a 2007 federal injunction against the most questionable permits for mountaintop removal (Kennedy, Jr. “Hope in the Mountains”). The federal court had originally granted the injunction because it ruled that the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) had not been using adequate environmental analysis to review permit applications (Eilperin). For the next month, then, the Army Corps of Engineers, the body ultimately responsible for the granting of mountaintop removal permits, began rapidly approving permits to ease the backlog until the Obama White House decided to intervene (Hamburger and Wallsten; Kennedy, Jr. “Hope in the Mountains”). On March 24, 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency announced its intention to thoroughly review hundreds of mountaintop removal permit applications not yet approved by ACE and protested one specific application (Eilperin; Kennedy, Jr. “Hope in the Mountains”). In April the EPA lodged complaints against three additional permits because of threats to water quality in surrounding areas and because of a streamlined approval process that the Army Corps of Engineers had adopted to speed their reviews (Bontrager).

However, by May the EPA reversed its course, declining to block dozens of mountaintop removal permits in a letter to a West Virginia congressman. Apparently the issue had sparked heated debate within the White House, even leading to the heads of two federal agencies shouting and banging theirs fists on a table, according to an anonymous source (Hamburger and Wallsten). The Administration attempted to save face in June by
rolling out a new interagency agreement which, among other things, ended the fast-track approval process and strengthened federal oversight over state regulators, but the motion stopped short of ending the process altogether (Fahrenthold). Late June welcomed a congressional hearing on the topic, and Senators Cardin and Alexander continued to push their bill banning mountaintop removal (Abdullah).

_We Need Our Own Cameras_

“We saw the barren and crumbled remains of former mountains, and the poisoned water and lack of life the coal industry has left behind,” said Daniel Maurer, ETSU graduate student in history. “When you see the neon green and orange water, you’ll understand…” (Hartley)

In 2005, before mountaintop removal opposition groups secured much of a following, leaders of Coal River Mountain Watch, an early group, decided to push their protests to a new level. By connecting online with other environmental groups, they formed the idea of a Mountain Justice Summer, several months dedicated to education about and protest against the hated form of coal mining. In May 2005 about 50 volunteers, almost all college-age, reported for the first training workshop (Shnayerson 135). Since then, youth, especially college students, have played a vital role in the movement, forming much of its backbone.

Many, if not most, college students learn about mountaintop removal through events on their campus. In 2004, after the death of 3-year-old Jeremy Davidson by fly rock that crashed through his house while he slept, over 250 concerned citizens gathered at their local community college to discuss the tragedy and actions to take next (Still). By touring college campuses speaking about mountaintop removal and activism for two years, Judy Bonds helped push 50 different campus groups into forming Campus Climate
Challenge, a grassroots organization devoted to reducing the energy use of college campuses. After its second year, over 500 campus groups had joined the effort (Shnayerson 270). Out of eight students completing questionnaires in July 2009, seven of them first learned about mountaintop removal through events either held on their campus or sponsored by a group from their college. From film showings and weekend summits to professors and environmental groups, college campuses produce many new activists for this movement each year (See Appendix).

Converted college students then use their newfound information and activist spirit to educate their peers and influence their administrations. In 2007 students involved with Mountain Justice Summer undertook a new project, forming a Mountain Justice Spring Break geared especially for other college students. By the 2009 session, over 150 youth from all over the country participated in the week-long summit, and 14 of them were arrested during protests at Tennessee Valley Authority headquarters in Knoxville, Tennessee. The students also attended educational workshops and traveled to the location of the December 2008 coal ash spill in Kingston, TN and mountaintop removal sites (Hartley). At the University of the South in Sewanee, TN, the president of the Sewanee Peace Coalition organized a letter-writing campaign to the state’s governor in late 2008 after viewing a documentary on mountaintop removal (See Appendix A). In March 2009, Middlebury College students in Vermont planned a mass “freeze-mob” in their cafeteria to call attention to mountaintop removal and push their administration into divesting from corporations that employ the practice (Barge).

As these actions indicate, student activists objecting mountaintop removal access a surprisingly broad repertoire of contention. The eight activists surveyed in July 2009
cited a wide variety of actions taken by their respective organizations, such as call-in campaigns, marches, research papers, service projects, rallies, water testing, banner drops, lobbying, and listening projects (See Appendix). Most of these tactics have been used by American students for different movements in the past. For example, students of the Civil Rights movement participated in marches, and students protesting apartheid in the 1980s pushed for divestment by their universities. So though students protesting mountaintop removal employ a large variety of approaches in their activism, these tactics are mostly recycled from American history, most likely because they proved to be effective for previous movements.

However, students against mountaintop removal have utilized one medium – the Internet – perhaps more successfully than any other American student movement thus far. As noted in a 2009 entry about Mountain Justice Spring Break, “Mountaintop mining opponents have harnessed the power of the internet and media for their cause more aggressively than many environmental groups.” According to Rachel Barge, the director of Campus InPower, youth bloggers for Fired Up Media first covered the December 2008 coal ash spill in Tennessee, while major news outlets did not begin coverage until days later (Barge). At a United Mountain Defense organizational meeting in Knoxville for an upcoming rally, one protestor mused, “Fuck the media – we need our own cameras,” referring to the group’s ability to post videos on YouTube and other such web outlets.²

Because of the tremendous power of the Internet to spread information, the movement against mountaintop removal relies much less on traditional mass media than did its predecessors. In fact, much of the movement’s organization takes place online, as a large role for Mountain Justice and other such coalitions is providing an online forum

² 24 July 2009.
for various affinity groups and individuals to network. Seven of the eight student protesters questioned for this research reported using e-mail in organizing their groups’ meetings and events, and one of them reported using Facebook, a social networking website used largely by college students (See Appendix). Over 30 anti-mountaintop removal groups exist on Facebook, and these groups attract hundreds of members.\(^3\) Because many methods of posting information online are free and can be accessed by most Americans, activists utilizing the Internet avoid two of the largest pitfalls faced by traditional student protesters – lack of funds and lack of media attention. Thus students in the movement against mountaintop removal have both operated wisely for the success of their campaign and also welcomed a new medium for student protest – “...and the Web’s full potential as a power source [for student protesters] has only begun to be tapped,” (Boren 248).

**Analysis**

Because the United States enjoys an open, democratic political system – Freedom House gives the country its highest rating for both political rights and civil liberties (*Freedom...*) – its level of interference with the Internet is minimal. Two other effects of this democratic government are that the students involved in the movement against mountaintop removal pursue their goal domestically by attempting to change government policy by way of swaying public opinion and that the largest political opportunity for this movement arose with a change in domestic government – the election of Barack Obama to the presidency. As Obama has proven to be more sympathetic to the goals of the movement than his predecessor, his election has caused the likelihood for success of the

\(^3\) As of 23 August 2009.
movement to increase, according to McAdam’s discussion of political opportunity (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 25).

Furthermore, because the government only minimally censors or controls Internet access or content, these students perceive the Internet to be an effective tool, and so they have used it extensively to both organize (such as through e-mail and Facebook) and report stories (such as the coal ash spill). The movement has had some difficulty changing policies within the United States, but its efforts have been strengthened intensely by the Internet; after all, the hallmark of the movement, Mountain Justice, was formed online, and today the movement operates as a coalition of decentralized affinity groups to a degree only possible with the Internet. Overall, then, the Internet is a highly effective tool for students involved with the movement against mountaintop removal.

2. Chile

Copper has long been hailed as a “mixed blessing” in Chile, responsible for both booms and busts, national pride and national protest. In 1970 this one commodity accounted for nearly 90% of Chile’s foreign export earnings (Klubock 369). And though the red metal’s share of export wealth has now declined relative to other goods, representing about 56% of the country’s exports in 2007, a multibillion-dollar operation still depends solely on its extraction (“Falling Copper Prices Hurt Chile”). Because so much of Chile’s foreign income depends on copper, this commodity has yielded great power over the Chilean economy since the industry’s inception. Additionally, the copper industry has vastly impacted the course of Chilean society over the past four decades, as evidenced by the repertoire of protest that Chilean society has developed around it.
Miners Challenge Pinochet

When Augusto Pinochet overthrew President Salvador Allende in September 1973, he saddled himself with an economic downturn marked by high inflation and food shortages that had originated with a two-year drop in international copper prices (“Chile” 309). In response Pinochet instituted various liberal economic policies, such as diversification and privatization (“Pinochet sends...” 60). His bold strategies, coupled with an increase in international copper prices, induced an economic upturn in 1976 (“Chile” 309), with GDP growth averaging over 7% until 1981. However, he did not liberalize all facets of the economy. Instead, when Pinochet seized power, he maintained government control over the country’s most important export business, copper mining, which Allende had nationalized through a constitutional amendment in the summer of 1971 (Weyland 90; Sigmund 325). Additionally, Pinochet wielded his power and froze the wages of miners in 1973 in order to increase profits (Finn 69). By 1978, the values of these wages had actually decreased because of inflation, and so the miners of Chuquicamata responded with daily hunger strikes (69). More strikes came in early 1980 at the El Teniente mine, whose workers demonstrated for more desirable labor policies and effectively shut down the mine, which produced one-third of Chile’s copper exports (de Onis 9).

These costly strikes, added with a fall in international copper prices and increased debt, set the stage for an economic downturn in 1982, which led to higher unemployment and inflation (“Pinochet sends...” 60; “Chile” 309). This downturn, which lasted for the rest of the decade, brought further social unrest and popular opposition to the military regime (Schumacher A3). The Confederacion de los
Trabajadores del Cobre, the copper miners' federation, led the charge by announcing a general strike and a national day of protest against the Pinochet regime in May 1983 (Klubock 369). These strikes continued into June, at which point Pinochet's approval rating had plummeted from 70% in 1980 to a meager 18%, as reported by Chilean newspapers (Schumacher A3). Between 1981 and 1984, Chileans suffered, on average, a 20% drop in living standards ("Pinochet sends..." 60), and in October 1985 mining families showed their displeasure by marching from Chuquicamata to Calama, "calling for social and economic justice" (Finn 69). Pinochet lost the referendum on his power in 1988.

*The Penguin Revolution*

Throughout the 1990's to the present, an electronics boom boosted international demand for copper, leading to higher prices and marked economic expansion ("In search..."). Between 1990 and 2005, GDP in current prices more than tripled, growing from US $31.6 billion to US $118.3 billion (IMF WEO). When Michelle Bachelet campaigned for the presidency in 2005, one of her promises to the country was to maintain this growth. Upon taking office in 2006, though, she faced the reality of two domestically unpopular economic policies instituted by past administrations: the stabilization fund, and the copper law. The stabilization fund, financed by copper revenue surpluses, had been created to balance the budget when copper revenues were below projections (Attwood 4). The copper law, which was written in the 1950's, but strengthened under Pinochet, allocated 10% of state-owned copper profits to the armed forces and stipulated that this payment not fall below $225 million per annum ("Copper-bottomed"). Both policies were extremely relevant when Bachelet took office because by
2006, international copper prices had quadrupled due to increased Chinese demand, creating an “economic windfall” (Rohter 4).

Within the first three months of her presidency, Bachelet was tested by powerful domestic unrest. On May 21 she addressed Congress and pledged to address social concerns, as she had promised in her campaign, but she also agreed to do so while maintaining the austere fiscal polices of the past decades (Rohter 4; “Coping…”). Coordinating only with e-mail and cell phones (Langman), high school students from across the country began to organize a massive protest beginning the next day; first students took over a public all-girls school, and from there the movement spread rapidly (Reel A01; Valenzuela and Dammert 75). The students demanded generally that the windfall copper profits be used to invest in the future of the country through sorely-needed education improvements, and they demanded specifically for such changes as free bus passes for students and free college-entrance exams (“Chile: Massive Student Protests…”). Over 650 schools were occupied by protesters, and almost 300 went on strike altogether; all told, over 800,000 students participated in the Penguin Revolution, so dubbed because of the black and white uniforms of the country’s public schools (ibid; Reel A01). The movement continued through June and only quelled when the Education Ministry began direct talks with the student leaders (Reel A01). Free bus passes and waived examination fees were granted to students with greatest need, 12 students were placed on a 73-member panel created after the strike to study education reform, and an extra US $133 million was added to the education budget (“Chile: Massive Student Protests…”).
Analysis

Like with the United States, Freedom House has awarded Chile its highest scores for political rights and civil liberties and declared the state as “Free” (Freedom…), and so this conditional variable of regime type produces minimal government interference into the Internet, the independent variable. The effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is then conditioned by political opportunity. This political opportunity for students to address their dilapidated schools arose with the handover of political power to Bachelet, who was then weak because of her short time in office and the conflicting promises she had made. Because of the minimal interference into the Internet by the Chilean government, the students perceived the Internet to be an effective tool and thus used it to organize their rallies. Their intuition proved to be correct, as this tool helped the movement to amass nearly a million participants and to secure concrete policy changes from its government.

3. Iran

Background

From 1997-2004, a reformist movement brewed against the ruling government in Iran (Saghafi and Ehsani 16). The most active participants in this effort were students (18), who risked not only their academic careers but also their lives in countering the regime so vocally. Protests in 1999 and 2003 came to bloody ends at the hands of the government: dissenting students were defenestrated, beaten with bricks, and jailed (MacFarquhar). For the efforts of the students and others sympathetic to the cause, some reformists were elected to parliament during the struggle. But for the 2004 elections, the
Guardian Council, the clerical body responsible for upholding the constitution and Islamic law, barred 2,400 reformist candidates from running (Saghafi and Ehsani 16-17), including all of the sitting members of parliament (deputies) from the two reformist parties. Those sitting deputies spoke out against their exclusion and staged sit-ins at the parliament building, but their protests came to little, as the student organizations that had been so critical over the past seven years supported the efforts of the deputies only halfheartedly; the students, though still desirous of reform, had become somewhat disillusioned after their past failures to spark change in the country, and they blamed the reformist deputies for not accomplishing anything while in office and claimed that the bigger problem was the body of law in Iran (17).

With so many reformists barred from the election, conservatives won two-thirds of the seats in parliament in 2004 (16-17). However, Iran had held strong elements of popular participation for 25 years previous to those elections, and the political culture of the state was arguably moving toward democracy; thus, many predicted that the move by the conservatives to control elections and limit the republican elements of Iranian government could not last (21-22). As Saghafi and Ehsani wrote at the time, “…sooner or later, the controversy over the configuration of the Iranian state will return to the center of national and international attention,” (22).

Over three years later, in late 2007, students at Tehran University began to gather in demonstrations, calling for the release of several imprisoned activists. Protests continued through the winter and into the spring, morphing into anti-government rallies more broadly. In March 2008 over 3,000 students gathered for 9 successive demonstrations at Shiraz University, chanting, “The student movement is ready for the
uprising,” (“Dissidents…”). The student movement for reform was gathering strength once again. By May 2009, anticipating the upcoming presidential elections in June, protesters gathered outside of the headquarters of the state-controlled broadcasting corporation to challenge its slanted coverage in favor of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad over other presidential candidates (Jedinia). This defiance of the state for the purpose of promoting freedom of the press and political liberties foreshadowed the events to come after the election.

*Tiananmen + Twitter = Tehran*

On Friday, June 12, 2009, the day of the election, a reported 85% of the electorate voted. By the next day, the government announced the results of the election; but rather than declaring victory for Mir Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister and the favorite to win, the government declared sitting President Ahmadinejad the winner, purportedly with 64% of the national vote (Cardwell). Immediately, Mousavi charged the government with election fraud (“Protesters erupt…”), as these results seemed unlikely considering the mood of the electorate before the election; for example, on June 9, just three days before the election, tens of thousands of people had formed a human chain stretching 12 miles across Tehran to show their support of Mousavi (Fassihi). Furthermore, ahead of the election even the conservatives of Iran had been divided over whether or not to support Ahmadinejad’s bid for reelection (Jedinia).

After the declaration of Ahmadinejad’s victory on Saturday, then, much of the country was distressed, and thousands of protesters immediately took to the streets after mobilizing largely via Internet social networking sites (“Iran protesters…”; “Protest
erupt...”). Despite violence in interactions with police (“Protests erupt...”), the movement snowballed, and by Monday hundreds of thousands of people were protesting in Tehran alone (Cardwell). In the first few days of the protests, experts predicted that the state would struggle to squelch the movement quickly as it had done with previous student-led riots because of the following several factors: the enormous size of the protests; the existence of a central rallying figure in Mousavi; the pervasive anger that can only stem from something as penetratingly influential as a national election; and the unprecedented coalition between Iranian pragmatists and reformists to counter the hard-line conservatives in the country (MacFarquhar). Indeed, the fall-out from the 2009 election developed into the largest popular movement in Iran since the Islamic Revolution 30 years before (Meyer).

The government responded immediately and actively tried to suppress the protests, mostly through trying to control the gathering places of the dissidents and their methods of communicating with the world outside of Iran. First, in the past many protests were staged at universities because of the power of the Office for Consolidating Unity, the largest student organization in the country (Sagahafi and Ehsani 17), and because of a national law that prohibits police from university campuses (Fathi, “Iranian Students...”). To check this center of power for the students and other protesters, Iranian officials began shutting down universities on Friday, the day of the election (Dehghan, “Students in Iran...”). Second, the Iranian government attempted to shut off the information flow to outside of the country. According to the National Iranian Business Council, government officials sequestered the cameras and film of journalists from the American broadcasting corporations NBC and ABC (Bright). Additionally, visas for
most foreign reporters expired within a few days of the election, and the government pushed for them all to leave without delay (Stelter). BBC satellite signals were blocked, the website for Tehran Bureau, an online news organization, was shut down temporarily (Bright), Moussavi’s website was blocked indefinitely ("Iran Protesters..."), and on Tuesday, Iran commanded all foreign journalists still in the country not to cover the protests or any stories related to Moussavi (Fathi, “Protesters...").

Due to this state censorship, most first-hand information concerning the accused election fraud and the subsequent protests began to emerge from spheres of the Internet, namely the blogosphere and social networking sites, that had not yet been shut down completely (Bright). As one American news magazine would report later in the week, “While the front pages of Iranian newspapers were full of blank space where censors had whited-out news stories, Twitter was delivering information from street level, in real time...” (Grossman). In Iran, the government can easily block individual websites because the Internet in the country is both government-operated and provided through only a small number of central gateways (Kaste).\(^5\) However, in the fallout of the election, the government had difficulty blocking social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook definitively because finding shortcuts around blocked websites through proxy web servers outside of Iran is fairly simple and because social networking sites are generally decentralized and thus can be accessed via third-party websites (Kaste; Grossman). One option the government possessed was shutting down the Internet in the country completely through the central gateways, but because commerce (and

\(^5\) As means of further explanation, Kaste compares the Iranian Internet configuration to that of a college campus in the United States, where servers are generally operated by the school and provided by a very small number of gateways (Kaste).
government, for that matter) within the country depends so heavily on the Internet now, this would have been the “equivalent of going nuclear” (Kaste).

Before the launch of the summer 2009 protests, Iran already had a comparatively large number of bloggers per capita within the state; furthermore, up to 70% of country is under age of 30 and familiar with new technology (Boyle and Choney; Meyer). Therefore, the youth of the country simply adopted a familiar tool for a new cause (Boyle and Choney). One of the major stories first reported from students in Iran was the claim of an attack in a dorm at the University of Tehran on Sunday, June 14. Pictures and videos flooded the Internet, and reports surfaced claiming the arrests of over 150 students, the death of one, at least one building ablaze, and resignations of several professors (“Witnesses…”). The Office for Consolidating Unity confirmed the story on Wednesday and adjusted the number dead after the attack to 5 (Fathi, “Protesters…”). De facto amateur journalists reported government kidnappings and general police brutality as well (Grossman; Cardwell). Their uploaded content also showcased their frustration with the government-controlled media, which they believed were not providing an accurate account of events (“Witnesses…”).

Indeed, the state media were not sitting idly. By Wednesday, June 17, YouTube was blocked, with uploaded content from Iran down by 90% (Stelter), and Twitter and Facebook were restricted, though access for some was still possible through proxies. On Wednesday the Revolutionary Guard declared that all Internet content originating from Iran that engendered “tension” must be removed (Meyer), threatening Internet users publishing information about the election or the protests with arrest and even execution (Boyle and Choney). Government officials began pose as bloggers and journalists online
so as to catch violators (Boyle and Choney), and indications that the government was penetrating the Twitter network and posting its own propaganda arose (Grossman). Additionally, police officers were more apt to pursue those with cell phones or cameras at the protests themselves ("Witnesses..."); and at least one photograph published in a pro-government newspaper had been digitally altered to increase the apparent size of the crowd at a pro-Ahmadinejad rally (Boyle and Choney).

Outside of Iran, the information relayed via the Internet drew attention. Members of the Iranian diaspora, especially students studying abroad, planned and attended solidarity demonstrations in various places, including Los Angeles and San Diego in California (Willon), the University of Iowa, and Washington, D.C. (Simmons). More notably, though, the U.S. State Department stepped into the Internet fray by asking Twitter operators to postpone a network update scheduled in the U.S. for the night of Monday, June 15 so as to leave the network open for protesters in Iran, where it would be daytime on Tuesday. The website agreed and rescheduled for Tuesday afternoon, or early Wednesday morning in Iran (Grossman; Meyer). Officially, President Obama expressed "deep concerns" about the situation in Iran but pledged to keep out of Iranian internal affairs (Meyer). Western media coverage of the protests lagged at first – The Economist reported that adequate coverage by American news networks did not begin until June 16, four days after the election – but eventually fixated on the story, after information began pouring in from the Internet ("Twitter 1..."). Once these outside sources began running the stories from Iran, though, they could not do so without caveats because verification of the events and claims was virtually impossible (Grossman).⁶

Also, within the first week of the protests, Twitter became useless as a source for

⁶ For example, “CNN cannot independently confirm this or other reports.” ("Witnesses...").
information anyways because American and British sympathy “tweets” about the protests diluted the actual reports from Iranians (“Twitter 1…”). Some in the American news media expressed concern that the fervor created by the new technologies was fleeting and that the focus by Western media on Iranians’ use of online social networks, rather than the actual protests, would weaken the legitimacy of the movement (Boyle and Choney).

On Thursday, June 18, Mousavi called for another wave of protests (Boyle and Choney). But Amnesty International announced the next day that at least 10 protesters had been killed in the week following the election, and over the next week government suppression intensified, keeping many off the streets out of fear. On June 25, a week after his call for a renewed effort, Mousavi urged his supporters to continue the movement in ways that would not “‘create [further] tension’” with the government (Cardwell).

After those two contentious weeks of protest, the anti-government movement in Iran has continued, driven largely by students. However, the protests now are generally smaller and more spread apart. In September, protesters took to the streets on Quds Day, a day traditionally designated for protest against Israel (Mackey). After the start of the new school year, students protested at Tehran University and Sharif University before planned visits of government officials (Fathi, “Iranian Students…”). Throughout the fall, the protest continued as an underground movement at universities – students wore green, the color of the movement, and protests were held at several schools. Some students were arrested, and around 20 were expelled. Ahmadinejad, of course, is still in office (Dehghan, “Iran students…”).
Analysis

Iran is “Not Free,” as indicated by Freedom House reports; its scores for political rights and civil liberties both rank at 6, with 7 being the worst score possible (*Freedom*...). Because the government is repressive, it has a proclivity for censorship, meaning that its level of interference into the Internet, the independent variable, is high. When the government attempted to cut off the flow of information to outside of the country by blocking foreign media and ushering foreign journalists out of the country, it created a political opportunity for the protesters. Because they had no hope of affecting the behavior of their government from within, the protesters attempted to create a boomerang effect by appealing to outside actors. However, this attempt did not work, as foreign media, instead of focusing on the cause of the riots, sensationalized them by focusing on the use of social networking websites. Also, global actors chose to refrain from involving themselves in what they viewed as “internal” Iranian politics. Thus, after about two weeks of international flurry and talk, the world moved on and Iran’s regime remained intact. Thus, the high level of government interference with the Internet, the independent variable, caused a low level of effectiveness of the Internet, the dependent variable. Protesters, especially students, nonetheless attempted to use the Internet to further their cause; sensing this, the Iranian government shut down that portal.

4. China

Writing in 2002, T. David Mason and Jonathan Clements argued that all signs indicated that China was ripe for a mass protest, which it had not experienced since 1989:
they predicted that the economy could not sustain its growth, meaning that economic
grivances could arise within the populace; that students and workers could fill leadership
roles necessary for a large movement; and that the current leadership in China was less
likely to respond with violence than in 1989 and the Chinese people knew that. They
reasoned that whether or not a movement would emerge depended largely on the
emergence of a rift in Chinese leadership, a triggering national event, and the ability of
organizers to connect localized protests into one movement. But as admitted, fostering
that connection would require “organizational resources” (and other elements) that
largely have not yet developed (Mason and Clements 182).

Unlike in many other countries, the Internet has not developed into a reliable
resource for social movements in China. Instead, this development has been choked
because, although China forms the largest online community in the world (CIA World
Factbook), it also is the “world’s leading jailer of journalists and cyber-dissidents”
(Southerland). The Chinese government relies heavily on censorship to control the flow
of information in the country as way of preventing uprisings and maintaining the power
of the regime. So, while Chinese students are “among the most Web-savvy in the world,”
everything that they do online is subject to censorship (Southerland).

China carries out its restriction of the Internet through four channels: outside
companies; an internal blocking system; government employees; and the general
populace. First, the overall censorship effort depends in large part on cooperation from
Western companies, such as Yahoo!, Microsoft, and Google (Markoff). For example, in
2002 Yahoo! signed the Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the Chinese Internet
Industry, which, according to its language, aimed to protect Chinese citizens from the
“adverse influences of... [harmful] information” (Goldsmith and Wu 9). Then in 2005, after a Chinese journalist used his Yahoo! e-mail account to send the transcript of a Communist party meeting to an American website, China asked the company to reveal the man's identity, and Yahoo! complied. The man was sentenced to 10 years in prison (Goldsmith and Wu 10).

Second, China's Internet blocking system, referred to by challengers as “the Great Firewall of China” (Markoff), is “in its own league for filtering.” The state has developed internal websites and tools that meet Chinese censorship standards, and it recently announced that soon all computers sold domestically would automatically come equipped with state-approved filtering software (Stelter and Stone). Third, the state employs over 40,000 censors in total, and thousands of them are students hired to proliferate pro-government propaganda online (Markoff). Fourth, it has put much of the burden on Chinese citizens themselves. The country has set purposely vague guidelines for judging the appropriateness of content and simultaneously imposed potentially severe consequences for nonconformity; the effect, intended and actualized, is that people and companies subject themselves to self-censorship (Southerland; Thompson). Also, the government places the onus on Internet service providers and Internet café owners for the content viewed by their clients (Southerland).

Chinese citizens can access most content on the Internet (Markoff) -- the state does not generally touch entertainment-driven substance, for example. However, many, especially pro-democracy activists, argue that the content that is restricted is what is most crucial for Chinese citizens to see. In this thinking, some expatriate members of Falun Gong, a religious movement banned by the Chinese state since 1999, sought to provide
the Chinese people with another option. These individuals, deeply affected by the events that they witnessed in Tiananmen Square in 1989, developed the Global Internet Freedom Consortium, which operates mainly out of the United States and provides proxy servers to those inside of China’s firewall. By downloading free software developed and provided by the organization, Chinese people can view online content blocked by their government (Markoff). In 2008 and 2009, the U.S. Congress appropriated $20 million of the State Department budgets to the Consortium, approving their mission of opening Chinese Internet access and thereby promoting transparency and democracy. However, in 2008 the State Department gave most of the allocated money to another group, and it has yet to disburse the 2009 funds. The U.S. Senate has set aside $30 million for the Consortium in a draft of the 2010 budget (”Twitter this…”).

Some students have successfully used the Internet to spread information about their causes. For example, in June 2008 a protest of female students erupted at their college over a perceived discrepancy with their degrees. Armed police were summoned to disperse the crowd, and violence between the two sides followed. Afterwards, students posted messages about the incident online, claiming that the protests began after the school’s administration declined to meet with the aggrieved students and that 50 students had been killed in the aftermath with the police. They also posted video footage capturing the duration of the police brutality. When interviewed, the spokesperson for the administration maintained only that “The video was taken and put on the Web by some bad students… This is a small problem and it has been resolved,” (Chan).

Such incidents, combined with lingering memories of May and June of 1989, are clearly registered with the Chinese government. In the months and days preceding the
20th anniversary of the protests in Tiananmen Square and other areas of the country, the government took extra precaution. Before previous anniversaries, it had removed dissidents from major cities and blocked foreign media broadcasts. In 2009 the state repeated these actions but also took the next step of blocking various websites it considered threatening, a move that signals the importance of the Internet in Chinese society today. In March the government blocked YouTube, and the site remained down through June (Bodeen), and on May 22, the website for Yanhuang Chunqiu, a political magazine, was also blocked. On June 1, three days before the actual anniversary, a government-controlled magazine published an article urging local government officials to be alert and to take Internet dissidence seriously, warning that “the Internet has become a major mobilization tool and advocacy channel for ‘mass incidents’ in China.” The next day China successfully blocked Twitter, Hotmail (an e-mail service owned by Microsoft), Bing (a search engine also owned by Microsoft), and Flickr (a photo-sharing platform owned by Yahoo!) (Kwok). Blogs, forums, and discussion boards on more than 6,000 university and college websites were also blocked before the anniversary (Bodeen). The state clearly did not hesitate to act on its fear that social networking sites would be used by students to organize and excite the masses (Kwok).

In fearing the websites, though, the Chinese government underestimated the success of its long-term efforts to downplay the events at Tiananmen Square. Writing for *The Washington Post*, Dan Southerland recounted a meeting he had in 2007 with a Chinese graduate student studying in the United States. In the course of their conversation, Southerland realized that the student had no idea what he meant by “6-4,” a Chinese reference to Tiananmen Square. Over the past 20 years, Chinese censorship of
virtually all media, including school textbooks, television, and newspapers – has largely expunged the event from the younger portion of Chinese society (Southerland). Students now are more worried about jobs and salaries than democracy and freedom; they are “virtually oblivious” to the events of 1989. In result, many Tiananmen veterans regard today’s students as apathetic (MacLeod). In contrast, the largest demonstrations on the 20th anniversary, drawing thousands of people, occurred in places like Hong Kong and the U.S. (MacLeod).

Analysis

Like Iran, China is also “Not Free”; Freedom House ranks its political rights with a 7 (the worst possible score) and its civil liberties a 6 (Freedom...). This lack of freedom translates directly into censorship and a high level of government interference with the Internet. With the 20th anniversary of Tiananmen Square, no political opportunity for student activists arose because no outlet to the outside world was allowed. Furthermore, students perhaps would not have even taken advantage of such an outlet because knowledge of events of 1989 – their repertoire of contention – has largely been expunged, also through censorship. Thus, the extreme level of government interference into the Internet translated into almost complete ineffectiveness of that tool for would-be student protesters. Because of the Internet’s perceived futility, it will likely not be adopted as a mobilizing structure until either the regime or its level of censorship change.
CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the Internet has become a positive tool for student social movements worldwide. As this network becomes increasingly more common and a larger part of global culture, more movements will probably begin to utilize it to further their causes. Even in the most repressive countries, the Internet has had some impact on social movements. For instance, in the midst of the 2009 protests in Iran, both Facebook and Google launched web services in Farsi (“Iranian protests…”). Before the introduction of the Internet in China, the state controlled virtually every form of the media, and citizens had no input. The Internet, though, has provided a forum for public opinion through discussion boards, even if those functions are censored. Now, public speech in China is nearly quotidian (Thompson).

However, as the four case studies have shown, the effectiveness of the Internet as a tool for student social movements depends directly on the type of regime governing the country. (See Figure 2.) If the regime is open, the level of government interference into the Internet is low, and the effectiveness of the tool for social movements is high. If, on the other hand, the regime is repressive and the level of its interference is high, the Internet is rendered virtually meaningless, no matter the number of people who utilize it. (See Figure 3.)

The story of the Internet and student protest movements will not end here, though. The Internet is still relatively young, and so its long-term implications are yet unknown. Perhaps as access to this awe-inspiring creation continues to spread, the power of information will overcome the thrust of censorship. As the Executive Director for Freedom House has expressed, the freedom of communication leads to desire for political
freedom (Meyer). Thus, in the future the Internet may prove powerful enough to spur political change through inciting the masses. For now, though, its effectiveness relies directly on the power of the state.

Figure 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT TYPE</th>
<th>FREEDOM HOUSE STATUS</th>
<th>POLITICAL RIGHTS SCORE</th>
<th>CIVIL LIBERTIES SCORE</th>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>Communist state</td>
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Sources: CIA World Factbook 2009
Freedom House Country Reports 2009

Figure 3

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<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>INTERNET HOSTS</th>
<th>WORLD RANKING</th>
<th>INTERNET USERS</th>
<th>PERCENT OF POPULATION</th>
<th>WORLD RANKING</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>877,817 (2009)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5.456 million (2008)</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>45,678 (2009)</td>
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<td>23 million (2008)</td>
<td>35%</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>14.156 million (2009)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>298 million (2008)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIA World Factbook 2009
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WORKS REFERENCED


APPENDIX

A: Jennifer Dusenberry. The University of the South. 22 July 2009.
C: Alex Davenport. James Madison University. 22 July 2009.
H: Emily Gillespie. West Kentucky University. 2 August 2009.
Questionnaire

Name: Jennifer Dusenberry
School: Sewanee
MTR Organization/Affiliation: Work through the Sewanee Peace Coalition
Length of involvement: 8-9 mths

Who participates in the student protest movement against mountaintop removal?

1. Have you ever participated in another social movement as an activist before joining in the campaign to end mountaintop removal (Y/N)?
   Yes

2. How would you describe your political views?
   My views would be put in the category of liberal.

How is this movement organized?

3. How did you first learn about mountaintop removal?
   I have heard other friends talk about the issue, and I did know about Mountain Justice. However, I did not really know the details of the issue till I did some research before a film showing of “Burning the Future: Coal in America.”

4. Why did you decide to become active in the movement against mountaintop removal? After watching the film, I realized that this environmental issue is simultaneously a social justice issue. Also, MTR is one of the few environmental issues that does not require people to look into the future and try to anticipate negative consequences. MTR has negative implications for the future, but it can be tied to social justice issues in the present. It can be tied to problems right in front of our eyes, yet it still seems to be ignored. (It's interesting that people often excuse the failings of the environmental movement with the excuse that it's hard to get people to look into the future, but this issue is so blatantly in the present and is still ignored.)

5. How are meetings/events/etc. for your organization planned? (e.g., face-to-face, mail, telephone, e-mail, social network site) Planning occurs mostly through email, and some face-to-face with the few active members of SPC. The emails are used as invitations and to ask various professors questions.
What does this movement do?

6. Do you have a concrete goal(s) for this movement? If so, what is it?
Since a majority of the SPC’s efforts are educational, it would be great to see a larger population of Sewanee students actually know more about the issue than the name implies. Hopefully, this knowledge would lead to greater participation in letter writing campaigns and cause the students to individually consume less energy and ask more of Sewanee in terms of energy conservation. In the bigger picture, I would like to add to the voices calling for an end to MTR and turn these voices into lobbying efforts.

7. What tactics have you utilized for this movement? (e.g., march, letter campaign)
So far, SPC has used letter campaigns and educational events like more film showings and inviting the MTR Roadshow.
Questionnaire

Name: marley green
School: recently of James Madison University
MTR Organization/Affiliation: Mountain Justice, JMU EARTH, Blue Ridge Earth First!, Wise Energy for Virginia, Southern Appalachian Mountain Stewards
Length of involvement: nearly 4 years

Who participates in the student protest movement against mountaintop removal?
1. Have you ever participated in another social movement as an activist before joining in the campaign to end mountaintop removal (Y/N)?
   No, not really.

2. How would you describe your political views?
   I believe that small communities, towns, cities and neighborhoods should have the political power to decide their political course, to share or limit resources. Decentralization, anti-authoritarianism, local sustainability, local autonomy and community empowerment are all phrases that line up with my political views, and I do not like to affiliate with the national democratic or republican parties.

How is this movement organized?
3. How did you first learn about mountaintop removal?
   Larry Gibson, coalfield community member and activist, came and gave a speech at JMU in the fall of 2006, brought by another student activist.

4. Why did you decide to become active in the movement against mountaintop removal?
   After Larry spoke at my school, I was invited to come tour his property and the mining happening around his home. During that visit I met people, both with similar life stories to myself, and folks from the Coal River Valley, who were involved in the movement, and who inspired and intrigued me. They felt like people who I could understand and get a long with, and they asked me to come back to the Valley in the summer, so I did. Also during that visit, I was struck so emotionally deeply the visual devastation of MTR, and by the stories I heard from local activists that I decided that I could not not get involved. Something had to be done.
5. How are meetings/events/etc. for your organization planned? (e.g., face-to-face, mail, telephone, e-mail, social network site)
   There are email listservs for mountain justice, earth first!, jmu earth and wise energy for virginia where many events and meetings are coordinated or discussed. Each of these groups also has regular or semi-regular face to face meetings where further events are planned. Telephone conversations and conference calls are also important forms of communication where events are coordinated.

**What does this movement do?**

6. Do you have a concrete goal(s) for this movement? If so, what is it?
   Stop MTR. Stop MTR. Stop MTR. All other work stems from this goal. Make it stop. Also, to build a more sustainable and healthy Appalachian region free of the abuses and exploitations of coal, timber, gas and other multi-national corporations.

7. What tactics have you utilized for this movement? (e.g., march, letter campaign)
   Everything, this is a diverse movement, with many people in many different organizations using many different tactics. Letter campaigns, call in campaigns, educational campaigns, books, research papers, marches, rallies, civil disobedience (overt and covert), legislative campaigns beyond MTR (energy efficiency, renewable energy support, green jobs support), community organizing, service projects and service campaigns. I have personally participated in almost each of these tactics.
Questionnaire

Name: Alex Davenport
School: JMU
MTR Organization/Affiliation: JMU EARTH, BREF! (Blue Ridge Earth First!), MJ
Length of involvement: 2 years, 1 year, and just hopping on.

Who participates in the student protest movement against mountaintop removal?
1. Have you ever participated in another social movement as an activist before joining in the campaign to end mountaintop removal (Y/N)?
   Yes.
   I am an active member of JMU’s chapter of Students for a Democratic Society

2. How would you describe your political views?
   I am still unsure of what exact “party” I would fall into, though I am both socially and economically liberal, it is easiest to describe myself as a radical leftist.

How is this movement organized?
3. How did you first learn about mountaintop removal?
   Through an Anti-MTR summit (“Weekend in Wise”) that members of JMU EARTH/BREF! attended.

4. Why did you decide to become active in the movement against mountaintop removal?
   After seeing the devastation caused in the Coal Fields I began to see the connection between human rights and environmental issues. I also felt that the larger human rights movement had moved beyond a grass-roots level and was looking for a way to get involved in making a real change. I know people who live in Appalachia, and to realize that this level of destruction was occurring, and that people didn’t know about it, really ignited my passion.

5. How are meetings/events/etc. for your organization planned? (e.g., face-to-face, mail, telephone, e-mail, social network site)
   Face-to-Face in weekly meetings, with outside working groups scheduling their own meetings, and through a google groups listserv.

What does this movement do?
6. Do you have a concrete goal(s) for this movement? If so, what is it?
   I see the ultimate goal of the ANTI-MTR movement as halting MTR, in the shorter term I think that there are multiple local sites which can be halted and viewed as goals.

7. What tactics have you utilized for this movement? (e.g., march, letter campaign)
   Marches, fund-raising, awareness/letter campaigns, and (locally) a bill of opinion passed at JMU stating the university’s opposition to MTR.
Questionnaire

Name: Katey Lauer
School: Hiram College
MTR Organization/Affiliation: Intake Working Group, general support, Ohio Area
Student Environmental Coalition
Length of involvement: 3 years

Who participates in the student protest movement against mountaintop removal?

1. Have you ever participated in another social movement as an activist before joining in the campaign to end mountaintop removal (Y/N)?

   No. –Only your basic recycling and food back kind of work.

2. How would you describe your political views?

   Ya know, I think we all deal with this question a lot. Reformist? Anarchist? Socialist? Democrat? I think the only word that I really feel comfortable with is “radical”—and I mean that word in its true sense: “from the roots.” I think change that addresses systemic problems (which is the sort of problem MTR is) must be systemic, or radical change.

How is this movement organized?

3. How did you first learn about mountaintop removal?

   Through some friends in a club at school. A couple of seniors took me down to a Fall Summit in Coal River my sophomore year. I met Larry Gibson, toured around, heard Judy speak.

4. Why did you decide to become active in the movement against mountaintop removal?

   1. The suffering and damage is impossible to ignore.
   2. The culture is beautiful and worth preserving. (It’s connected me a great deal more to my own Appalachian roots in PA.)
   3. Students have a lot of power.
   4. The community is wonderful.

5. How are meetings/events/etc. for your organization planned? (e.g., face-to-face, mail, telephone, e-mail, social network site)

   Email primarily. And face to face meetings. Oh, and lots of conference calls.
What does this movement do?

6. Do you have a concrete goal(s) for this movement? If so, what is it?

To end MTR.
To build sustainable, local economies in Appalachia.
To interact with one another and the world with an anti-oppressive mindset.

7. What tactics have you utilized for this movement? (e.g., march, letter campaign)

Wow, you name it. Marches, letter writing, lobbying, blockades, banner drops, call-ins, water testing, air monitoring, writing letters to the editor, deliberate volunteer recruitment...
Questionnaire

Name: Sarah McManus
School: New College of Florida (Sarasota, FL)
MTR Organization/Affiliation: United Mountain Defense (UMD)
Length of involvement: Summer 2008, Summer 2009

Who participates in the student protest movement against mountaintop removal?
1. Have you ever participated in another social movement as an activist before joining in the campaign to end mountaintop removal (Y/N)?

   Yes: Young Democrats → North Carolina Piedmont Green Party →
   New College Climate Justice Squad; also Everglades activism

2. How would you describe your political views?

   Broadly… green. If the Green Party could get their act together and the whole system wasn’t so corrupt, that’d be great. I like the way anarchist groups organize, but I don’t feel like I’ve read enough theory to call myself an anarchist exactly.

How is this movement organized?
3. How did you first learn about mountaintop removal?

   Ah… probably when I really started getting into environmental organizing, when I got to college in Fall ’07.

4. Why did you decide to become active in the movement against mountaintop removal?

   I met Matt Landon when he was tabling for UMD at the Southeast Student Renewable Energy Conference in (early spring?) 2008. I picked up an internship application and ended up working with UMD that summer.

5. How are meetings/events/etc. for your organization planned? (e.g., face-to-face, mail, telephone, e-mail, social network site)

   All of the above. Listserv, weekly UMD meetings, monthly MJ (Mountain Justice) meetings, yearly spring & summer action camps.
What does this movement do?
6. Do you have a concrete goal(s) for this movement? If so, what is it?

Ending mountaintop removal coal mining and all other surface coal mining, officially. Also working in solidarity with affected communities in Appalachia and other areas. Some individuals, including myself, are opposed to the destructive use of coal in general as a major fuel source.

7. What tactics have you utilized for this movement? (e.g., march, letter campaign)

Seems like everything (that’s nonviolent!). Call-ins, email & letter writing campaigns, lobbying (w/other groups), camps, tabling at festivals & shows, dinner fundraisers, music fundraisers, marches, rallies, demonstrations, civil disobedience, direct action, civil suits, exhausting administrative remedies, paperwrenching, going to public meetings, fliers, quartersheets, temporary tattoos, posters, shirts, buttons, stickers, street theatre (awesome clowns!), press releases, scientific data collection (air & water monitoring), outreach and listening projects in coalfield communities, Rainforest Action Network coal finance campaign, divestment campaigns on campuses and other organizations, etc!!
Questionnaire

Name: Miranda Brown
School: Murray State University
MTR Organization/Affiliation: Mountain Justice (MJ), Kentuckians for the Commonwealth (KFTC), Kentucky Student Environmental Coalition (KSEC)
Length of involvement:

Who participates in the student protest movement against mountaintop removal?

1. Have you ever participated in another social movement as an activist before joining in the campaign to end mountaintop removal (Y/N)?
   Yes, but not to much extent.

2. How would you describe your political views?
   Liberal

How is this movement organized?

3. How did you first learn about mountaintop removal?
   I first learned about mountaintop removal through our student environmental group at Murray State University. A couple of the groups’ members were very adamant that we table and do presentations on the subject. In the spring of my freshman year, our group visited a mountaintop removal mine site in Letcher Co., KY, with Kentuckians for the Commonwealth. That May, I attended Mountain Justice Summer training camp with some other students, which became a great jumping off point for getting more involved.

4. Why did you decide to become active in the movement against mountaintop removal?
   Hearing the stories from the people who live near the mining really affected me more than anything else, though there are other devastating effects to mtr. What they have to deal with—their dreams, their lifelong homes being washed away, their water poisoned, their crops ruined by slurry, harassment when they speak out about their lives being ruined—is unjust.

5. How are meetings/events/etc. for your organization planned? (e.g., face-to-face, mail, telephone, e-mail, social network site)
All of the above. One gets a little bogged down...Speaking about Mountain Justice, there are monthly in-person meetings scattered throughout Appalachia, meaning that not everyone can make it to each meeting. There is an email list and an organizers’ email list for discussion. For specific working groups within MJ, we often have conference calls—i.e. this past spring I participated in several conference calls to help plan the May action training camp.

Speaking about the Kentucky Student Environmental Coalition (KSEC) (which is how I got sent this questionnaire), we just started up within the past two years. So far our schedule has been one conference in the fall and one meeting in the spring. We have a chosen representative from each participating school in Kentucky, but other students are free to hop on conference calls and attend meetings. During the school year, we try to have a general conference call every month. We also use an email list serve and, being a student group, the Facebook social networking site is particularly important.

What does this movement do?

6. Do you have a concrete goal(s) for this movement? If so, what is it?
Mountain Justice’s primary goal is to end mountaintop removal. For the time being, this is one of KSEC’s primary goals as well. For most people, however, in order to achieve this goal, we have to couple it with the goal of creating more green jobs in the U.S. and further developing renewable energy and energy efficiency technology. Personally, I want to end mountaintop removal and eventually the burning of coal for electricity. The possibilities of green energy, an economy not dependent upon fossil fuels, and a holistic perspective of our human position within community and environment, are very exciting. I want to see those possibilities flourish. I want sustainability to characterize our communities and our thinking.

7. What tactics have you utilized for this movement? (e.g., march, letter campaign)
I’m constantly writing letters to my Congressmen, to President Obama, and to the Environmental Protection Agency. Our Murray Environmental Student Society regularly campaigns to get students to call their legislators on the state and national level. I’ve lobbied in Washington with the Alliance for Appalachia and met with my Congressmen’s district offices. I’ve marched on Frankfort, KY, with Kentuckians for the Commonwealth (KFTC) and marched in D.C. at the Power Shift Convention and marched in Coal River Valley in West Virginia with Mountain Justice. Also with Mountain Justice, I’ve gone door-to-door in mining communities to learn about people’s experiences and what they’ve seen happen on their mountaintops. As an individual and as a KFTC member, I’ve written articles for my local paper and university paper.
Questionnaire

Name: Joe Gorman
School: West Virginia University
MTR Organization/Affiliation: At my school I'm involved in the Sierra Student Coalition, which advocates the abolition of MTR but does not condone civil disobedience. I took part in an action as part of the Operation Appalachian Spring/Climate Ground Zero campaign, which is unaffiliated with any organization. I don't act on behalf of any organization; I act my conscience.
Length of involvement: since February 2008

Who participates in the student protest movement against mountaintop removal?

1. Have you ever participated in another social movement as an activist before joining in the campaign to end mountaintop removal (Y/N)?
   Yes, peace marches in Washington, DC

2. How would you describe your political views?
   Progressive

How is this movement organized?

3. How did you first learn about mountaintop removal?
   I learned about Mountaintop Removal from the WVU Sierra Student Coalition in 2008. That year, they took me to visit Kayford Mountain, where Larry Gibson has been trying to defend his family home from an encroaching MTR site.

4. Why did you decide to become active in the movement against mountaintop removal?
   As soon as I saw mountaintop removal for the first time, I knew I had to do something - if people like you and me didn't use so much electricity, there would be no mountaintop removal. Late last winter I found out that clearcutting had started on the Beetree Surface Mine on Coal River Mountain. I knew several people who had poured their heart out into the Coal River Mountain Wind project and vowed to save Coal River Mountain. I went down for an action in the Coal River Valley a week or two later.

5. How are meetings/events/etc. for your organization planned? (e.g., face-to-face, mail, telephone, e-mail, social network site)
   With the Sierra Student Coalition, most planning happens face-to-face. Most of the time I find out about Climate Ground Zero direct actions through email.

What does this movement do?

6. Do you have a concrete goal(s) for this movement? If so, what is it?
* Enforcement of existing environmental and safety laws and regulations
* End mountaintop removal
* End coal wet-processing
* End construction of new coal plants
* Shut down existing coal plants
* End political corruption in West Virginia government
* End cycle of exploitation and dependence in Appalachia

7. What tactics have you utilized for this movement? (e.g., march, letter campaign)
   At first I tried calling politicians' offices to voice my opinion. Then I lobbied.
   Then I protested outside a coal plant. Finally I went with several other activists
   and tried to shut a mountaintop removal site down ourselves...which gave us the
   opportunity to try and fight mountaintop removal in the courts.
Questionnaire

Name: Emily Gillespie
School: West Kentucky University
MTR Organization/Affiliation:
Length of involvement:

Who participates in the student protest movement against mountaintop removal?

1. Have you ever participated in another social movement as an activist before joining in the campaign to end mountaintop removal (Y/N)?
   yes

2. How would you describe your political views?
   Liberal Socialist...

How is this movement organized?

3. How did you first learn about mountaintop removal?
   Mountain Justice was tabling at a festival I went to. I immediately took of work to volunteer.

4. Why did you decide to become active in the movement against mountaintop removal?
   MTR is destroying eco systems in the three state I have lived in VA, WV, and KY. I feel that the social and environmental implications of MTR have the potential to ruin the entire region of appalachia by stripping the people of their way of life, and the land they call home.

5. How are meetings/events/etc. for your organization planned? (e.g., face-to-face, mail, telephone, e-mail, social network site)
   face-to-face, conference calls, consensus process

What does this movement do?

6. Do you have a concrete goal(s) for this movement? If so, what is it?

   Goals of Mountain Justice
   Raise world-wide awareness of Mountain Top Removal mining and its effects.
   Escalate resistance to Mountain Top Removal from a regional to a national level.
   Build our support base for the campaign.
   Unify and strengthen regional groups fighting Mountain Top Removal.
   Mobilize coordinated days of action using tactics ranging from public outreach to civil resistance.
   Maintain safety as a high priority.
Debunk the myth of "clean coal" and "jobs versus the environment". Encourage conservation, efficiency, solar and wind energy as alternatives to Mountain Top Removal and all forms of surface mining.

7. What tactics have you utilized for this movement? (e.g., march, letter campaign) direct action, listening projects, trainings in Non-violent civil disobedience, anti-oppression, appalachian cultural sensitivity, primitive skills, and other important organizing skills.

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Emily Gillespie
SEAC KY Regional Coordinator
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