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Lexis and Logos in Aristotle's Metaphysics

An Analysis of the Metaphysics
using the Poetics and Rhetoric

by S. Benedict Chen (Middle Tennessee State University)

Ben Chen is junior at Middle Tennessee State University and is currently pursuing a double degree in Philosophy and Journalism. Interested mainly in ethics and aesthetics, he is ultimately concerned with their application in situations that are both cross-cultural and transgenerational. After graduation, he is interested in going on ograduate school in Philosophy.

Introduction

The proper interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics has always been a hotly debated subject. This discussion falls mainly upon logical content. 'What Aristotle meant' in the Metaphysics has been taken to be synonymous with 'what are his logical implications?' Questions about literary intent are all to often ignored. The distinction between these two types of questions is a peculiar one, for it is not entirely clear that the two can be divorced from one another.

It has been common practice for an aspiring philosopher to analyze most philosophical works by reducing it into its logical form.¹ This has allowed students of philosophy to interpret major texts, without getting 'caught up' in their literary devices. Style, form, and literary intent become lost in the reduction of philosophical texts to 'philosophical moves.' Logos sits in the primary position of philosophical interest above Lexis .

Is literary form ancillary to argumentative content or does it play a key role in a text's interpretation? According to Martha Nussbaum, "literary form is not separable from philosophical content, but is, itself, a part of content , an integral part, then of the search for and the statement of truth." (Nussbaum 3) Literary form involves an investment in certain value and truth judgements.

Taking my point of departure from Martha Nussbaum, I will argue in the paper that, for Aristotle's Metaphysics, Lexis does play an important role, and that the mode of presentation that Aristotle uses is poetic in nature. In order to do so, I will analyze the Metaphysic,specifically books A and a, and apply principles that Aristotle himself puts forward in the Poetics and the Rhetoric. This argument will be done in five steps, as follows:

(1)indications of a unity of action throughout the Metaphysics.

(2)a focus upon the role of rhetoric and how its use indicates that the Metaphysics is to be interpreted as poetry (specifically in book A)

(3)the use of fear and pity and the role of emotional catharsis in the Metaphysics (specifically in book A)

(4)poetry as a vehicle for universal truths

(5)responses to possible objections

Unity of Action

In an introductory assessment of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Jonathan Barnes describes the work as being "a collection of essays, rather than a connected treatise," which "has no consecutive story to narrate." (Barnes 67) Closer observations of the work show how the fourteen books of the Metaphysics seem to have a "superficial appearance of unity," however, "the Metaphysics does not reveal any subtle or underlying unity." (Barnes 67) The relationship of the fourteen books to each other, according to Barnes, share only a limited sense of unity , in which the books cross reference each other and linking passages from book to book that does not support any interpretation of the Metaphysics as a treatise or manifest.

Jonathan Barnes' opinion on Aristotle's Metaphysics is a fairly common observation and in order to justify my opposition to it, I must first provide adequate doubt upon the accepted take, adequate enough to warrant considering a novel claim.

This will be done in two-part fashion. First, I will show how the notion that Aristotle's Metaphysics is 'merely a collection of lectures and notes' is not acceptable grounds for dismissing the form as having 'no discernable reason,' and second, I will provide examples in books A and a to show how Aristotle intentionally orders the books in such a way as to create an overall theme and cohesive unity.²

At first glance, the Metaphysics' apparent lack of cohesion and thematic unity would seem to be an obvious defect, and Barnes' attribution of this to the Metaphysics being a collection of lectures and notes seems to be a fair assessment except for one fact. All of what we have of Aristotle's works are "unpolished and inelegant, but brilliant collections of notes." (Hutchinson 197). Supposedly, a major part of the texts that made it to us are notes "associated with lectures and discussions that took place in Aristotle's Lyceum." (Hutchinson 197) In fact, from the catalogue of Aristotle's work, perhaps less than a third is accessible for modern reference.³ Much of what is accessible is regarded as collections of notes. Whether these were his personal lecture-notes (to be referenced during his class presentations), or his research notes (taken after discussions upon the lecture) is still very debatable. The Metaphysics is then not unique in its status as lecture notes, but is unique in the sense that it alone (of the surviving texts) seems to have no reasonable excuse for lacking any overall cohesive element.

Second, upon close investigation of books A and a, we notice how Aristotle anticipates certain issues throughout the entirety of the fourteen books. For example, Aristotle's discussion of the four causes in passages 982a-982b anticipates his discussion of Theology and account of the unmoved mover in book L, ⁴ his discussion of substance and essence in books F, G, and H,⁵ and also his discussion of the eminent cause in books Q , and L. Aristotle also anticipates books M and N with his discussion of number in 990a:19-30

And so a loose thread of unity is planted for the entirety of the Metaphysics in books A and a. Even though this thread does seem haphazard, there is evidence that points towards some sort of anticipation of problems that are dealt with in later books. This indicates that there is a sense of predetermined order though-out the Metaphysics, and that Aristotle had intended a 'reasonable' method of order into which the fourteen works fall.

In chapter xxiii of the Poetics, Aristotle states that a poem, and the construction of its stories "should be like that in a drama; they should be based on a single action, on that is complete and whole in itself, with a beginning, middle, and end, so as to enable the work to produce its own proper pleasure with all the organic unity of a living creature." (Bywater 1480:1459b-11-21) For Aristotle, this unity of action is an integral part of what it means for something to be poetry. When we compare this passage with one from chapter viii: "unity of plot does not, as some people think consist in the unity of the hero. For infinitely various are the incidents in one man's life which can not be reduced to unity; and so, too, there are many actions of one man out of which we can not make one action." (Butcher 33:1), we notice that, for Aristotle, this unity of action is not a telling of events that unfold, one after another until convenient closure. Rather, unity of action is more of a telling of a story, leaving out the unnecessary events in between. The action should be complete-in-itself, "carried out to its end" and "no loose threads should be left" (Bittner 97:1) while at the same time omitting incidents that play no significant part towards the completion of the end of said action.

For the Metaphysics, this action is introduced early in book A: "Clearly then Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes since we are seeking this knowledge, we must inquire of what kind are the causes and the principles."(Ross 691:982a/b 35-7) Acquiring knowledge of the first causes is then the 'end' of the activity in the Metaphysics. But it is not only end, it is end-in-itself with the much-quoted opening passage: "All men by nature desire to know."⁶ (689:980a 20) But, it is not the specific end of the Metaphysics (for such a general end can be attributed to all philosophical works). For Aristotle, the specific end of the Metaphysics is the establishment of a "science which investigates the first principles and causes." (Ross 692:982b 9/10) A "divine science" must be established and that is the specific unifying activity of the Metaphysics.

The Role of Rhetoric

On the assumption that the unifying action of the Metaphysics is the establishment of a science, we must consider how the content of the Metaphysics is based around methodology. Aristotle recognizes that he must overcome two major obstacles for his project quite early in Book A: how can we be assured of the methodology , the divine science , that we apply to the first principles and causes? What method do we use to test our method? This is illustrated in the following two passages:

And the first principles and the causes are most knowable; for by the reason of these, and from these, all other things come to be know, and not these by means subordinate to them. Hence also the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power; for in many ways, human nature is in bondage, so that according to Simonedes 'God alone can have this privilege', and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. (Ross 692:982b 2-4, 28-33)

Further indications of this tension appear in a closely following passage:

For the Science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities; for (I) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and (2) such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others. (Ross 693: 983b 7-10)

The problem of legitimating this methodology closely resembles the fable of Achilles and the Hare in the sense that there are inherent problems of justifying a system of justification in a non-circular fashion. For Aristotle, we soon discover that the method of justification that he is advancing is one that he refers to as dialectic.⁷

This tension is recognized, and Terrence Irwin advances a similar claim in Aristotle's First Principles by stating that "the use of dialectic philosophy seems to be severely limited; we seem to have no reason to claim that it leads us to the truth. Even if we agree that some sort of coherence among beliefs is a reasonable basis for claims to be knowledge, dialectical philosophy seems to overestimate intuitive beliefs." (Irwin 9: 1§4)

For Aristotle, the methodology which is employed to 'demonstrate' the worthiness of dialectic is rhetoric. For Aristotle, dialectic and rhetoric are counterparts to each other, in the sense that both are arts of proof. Aristotle's Rhetoric begins with the claim that rhetoric and dialectic are counterparts because,"in a way, both concern all topics" and that "rhetoric is not concerned with any single delimited kind of subject, but is like dialectic and that it is a useful art." (Lawson-Tancred 69: 1355b)

In fact, when we investigate the Rhetoric, we notice that book A of the Metaphysics resembles closely the description of rhetorical introduction, described in 3§14. For Aristotle, the "introduction, then, of display speeches are drawn from these things , from praise, from blame, from exhortation, from dissuasion, . . . but one must realize that the introduction of a forensic speech has the same effect as the prologues of plays and the introductions of epic poems." Furthermore, when we compare our findings in the preceding section of this paper, we will note that book A is not merely a rhetorical introduction, but a poetic introduction, in the sense that "there is an indication of a story, so that it may be known in advance what the tale is about." (Lawson-Tancred 247: 1415a)

On Pity, Fear, and Emotional Catharsis

For Aristotle, the role of emotion in poetry was one of great concern. Aristotle differs from his mentor, Plato, on the ethical nature of poetry because the evocation of emotion by poetry ultimately serves the Good. It does so through the use of catharsis, in which negative emotions are expunged of their negative qualities. This is not to say that after witnessing poetry, an audience member is no longer susceptible to the effects of the negative emotion, but rather that an audience member is able to rid him/herself of the counterproductive effects of such emotions. In this case, these emotions are fear and pity; their constituent effects are paralysis from action.

Early on in the Poetics, Aristotle discusses the role of catharsis in stating that a major role of (tragic) poetry is to arouse "pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish it catharsis of such emotions." (Bywater 1460:1450a 27-29) Aristotle continues his discussion of pity and fear in the Rhetoric by defining fear as "a kind of pain or disturbance resulting from the imagination of impending danger, either destructive or painful" (Lawson-Tancred 153: 1382a) and defining pity as "a certain pain occasioned by an apparently destructive evil or pain's occurring to one who does not deserve it, which the pitier might expect to suffer himself or that one of his own would, and whenever it should seem near at hand." (Lawson-Tancred 163: 1385b)

It is with regard to these rhetorical devices that we are able to interpret the historical account of philosophers who preceded Aristotle. We are, at the same time, enjoined to pity Anaximenes and Diogenes in the sense that we know that they are wrong in their assessments, while fearing the same outcome of being wrong in the way that Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Hippasus, and Empedocles were.⁸ This is not to say that they were utterly mistaken in their endeavors. However, they are characterized as being "found inadequate to generate the nature of things" and thus "were forced by the truth itself to inquire into the next kind of cause." (Ross 659: 984b 8-10) This is then compounded with the aforementioned passages⁹ that imply an impending possibility that we, too, are subject to the same kinds of failure.

We are exposed to these failures in order to incur a sense of fear about being wrong and we pity these 'mistaken' individuals so that we may achieve a catharsis of these emotions. This catharsis, in turn "provides an education of the emotions" and allows us to understand and overcome the limitations of these emotions."¹⁰ (Lear 318) This 'education' of emotion involves notions of habituation and mediation that echo themes advanced in the Nicomachean Ethics and is then used as a motivating device in the Metaphysics. In this sense, the Metaphysics relies upon tragic devices to provoke the emotions of fear and pity in its audience. This fear and pity, once we "come to understand [them]," become tools by which "we come better to understand the world, as fit objects of our emotional responses," and, in this case, as fit objects for our inquiry (Lear 319).

Poetry as an Adequate Vehicle for Universality

For Aristotle, the ultimate goal of the Metaphysics, as an exercise in philosophy, is 'to know'. Demonstrations of such knowing, provided in book A, are post hoc proofs. They are illustrative, but not essential to the argument that "all men, by nature, desire to know." Ultimately, dialectic philosophy is, as Terrence Irwin coins it, "severely limited" in its role in the investigation of Truth¹¹ , and yet Aristotle continues his investigation into Truth by characterizing knowledge of it as knowledge of universals.

Now, of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge; for he knows in a sense all the instances that fall under the universal. And these things, the most universal, are on the whole hardest to know. (Ross 691:982b 21-24)

When we compare this claim the with notion that dialectic philosophy is "severely limited," we can begin to understand why Aristotleseemingly 'throws a monkey-wrench' into his own project with the two aforementioned passages in a previous section of this paper.¹² And, it is because of the methodological limitations of dialectic that Aristotle continues his investigation using rhetorical and poetic devices; for these, like dialectic devices, are not constrained by "any single delimited kind of subject" but have application with "such things that are in a way common for all to grasp." (Lawson-Tancred 66:1354a)

For Aristotle, poetry is just as viable a vehicle for knowledge of universals as dialectic philosophy, for it can "simplify and reduce to a universal form" its object (Bywater 1472: 1455b 1). Poetry deals with things that are universal in nature, rather than merely particular. This is what separates poetry from history for Aristotle. This distinction is important because "poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular." This distinction, as offered in the Poetics, is then clarified through Aristotle's definition of universal as: [sic] how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity; and it is the universality at which poetry aims in the names she attaches to the personages. (Butcher 35: viii 3-5)

Aristotle's discussion of universal knowledge, as defined in the Poetics parallels similar notions of universality in the Posterior Analytics as something that "cannot be other than what it is" or necessary, while at the same time treating particularity as "the accidental" or "the contingent." For Aristotle, universal aspects are "attributes [sic which are] treated as those which belong necessarily (ex anangkeo) to their subjects" ¹³ (Ste. Croix 25)

Knowledge of the universal, rather than merely the particular is what separates a wise man from other human beings. With this in mind, we can understand more fully the capabilities that poetry can possess, in the sense that "poetry expresses most adequately the universal element in human nature," and that it can "liberate us from the tyranny of physical surroundings." Poetry can cause thought to "disengage itself from sense and makes itself supreme over thing outward." (Butcher 163)

Such is also the goal of the Metaphysics. To justify the use of dialectc, and the implicit claim that these principles are, in principle, subject to dialectic, Aristotle turns to the use of rhetorical and, ultimately, poetic devices for two reasons: (1) these principles are within the scope of their applicability,¹⁴ and (2) Universality, as S. H. Butcher puts it, is discovered as "the meeting point of poetry and philosophy in relation in which they stand to the universal." (Butcher 164)

Possible Objections

I will focus upon two possible objections that can be made to this interpretation. These are as follows: (1) Aristotle seems to want to make meter a criterion for epic poetry (which would be the type of poetry that the Metaphysics, if we are to believe that it is intended to be interpreted as poetry),¹⁵ and (2) There does not seem to be any indication of a character in the Metaphysics.

The first of these objections can be dealt with fairly readily. While meter is a constituent of verse, the type of meter is not specified in the analysis Aristotle offers for epic poetry. In fact, all that is demanded of meter is that the verse be one of a narrative nature, in which it presents a unified plot , and that it be consistent. Arguments for the Metaphysics manifesting a narrative structure have been made prior in this paper, and analysis of the body of the Metaphysics shows it to have prosaic consistency. There is not, reflected in the translation, an erratic switching between iambic and trochaic meter. Aristotle does state that "no one has ever written a long story in any but heroic verse; nature herself, as we have said, teaches us to select the meter appropriate." (Bywater 1482:1460a 2-5) But is in fact, as S.H. Butcher notes:

It is, however worth observing that from Aristotle's point of view, which was mainly one of observation, the question to be determined was rather as to the vehicle or medium of literary mimesis; and so far as the mimesis doctrine is concerned, it is undeniable that some kinds of imaginative subject matter are better expressed in prose, some in verse, and that Aristotle, who had before him experimental examples of writings poetic in spirit, but not metrical in form, had sufficient grounds for advocating an extension of meaning for the term poesis(Butcher 145)

The second objection is more serious. Aristotle makes no mention of any people who are active within the plot of the work itself. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the Metaphysics lacks characters. For Aristotle, characters are "that which reveals the moral purpose of the agents." In the Metaphysics, that agent is the method of dialectic philosophy. Through his rhetorical demonstrations, Aristotle illustrates how dialectic philosophy can effectively find knowledge of the universal, a good in itself. We watch Aristotle, throughout the Metaphysics, pit dialectic philosophy against great obstacles. For Aristotle, the philosophical problems of essence and form are not unlike the Odyssey's Scylla and Charibdis; overcoming them in order to find knowledge of universals is the job of dialectic philosophy, the agent of the moral end.¹⁶

It is interesting to note that Aristotle makes no specific recommendations in his discussion of Character in the Poetics. When he refers to character, Aristotle uses the term 'agent' instead of 'man' or 'person'. For Aristotle, the importance of character is not who or what a particular character is, but rather what that character does.

All human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which we live is a certain kind of activity, not a quality. Character gives us qualities, but it is in our actions, what we do, that we are happy or the reverse. (Bywater 1461: 1450 15-20)

Dialectic philosophy is not, in itself, good or bad. Aristotle makes this quite clear in his historical analysis of his predecessors. Dialectic philosophy, when applied in the proper way when it acts morally¹⁷ , can attain its telos, and then be considered good in its activity.

The agent, or character, of the action is then considered subordinate to the action itself. In fact, Aristotle seems to support the notion that this subordination is one in which "[tragedy] is impossible without action, but there may be [a tragedy] without character."¹⁸ (Bywater 1461: 1450a 20-23) Character holds its importance for Aristotle, only insofar as there is an agent, by which an activity may take place.

Conclusion

Interpreting the Metaphysics as a poem introduces certain topics which have been, up to date, neglected. One of these topics includes possibility of two distinct types of philosophy. If we investigate the difference between the Metaphysics and the Topics, we notice the roots of what is later classified as speculative and analytic philosophy. Aristotle seems to be clued in on this idea with his distinction between dialectic philosophy and rhetorical philosophy. Both, in essence, prove certain facts; dialectic does so through deduction and apparent syllogism, while rhetoric does so through demonstration and enthymeme. In the modern speculative school of philosophy, proof must be demonstrated while necessary relations are held in skepticism; in the modern analytic camp, logical relationships are held highest in regard, while 'tendencies' are overlooked (for the most part). Aristotle's distinction (and use) of both types of philosophy may indicate a point of reconciliation for the two schools.¹⁹

Another interesting result of interpreting the Metaphysics as a poem is the introduction of what I will call the ethics of methodology. Such a notion entails that philosophy, in and of itself, is an activity and not a good in itself. This is a result of acknowledging the ethical import of literary form. It most typical for a reader to interpret an agent (e.g. dialectical philosophy) as primarily accurate or inaccurate, however, once we take into account that literary style has ethical implications, we are forced to recognize the moral accountability that philosophers have in their actions.

Once philosophy is considered in such a way, questions of "how ought we do philosophy" become paramount. Such questions may have been introduced in reaction to the sophists. Difficult issues arise out of this notion; are there bad philosophers , as opposed to philosophers who do philosophy poorly? If so, what are the distinguishing characteristics of bad philosophers?

Interpreting Aristotle's Metaphysics as a poem allows us to recognize an appeal that Aristotle seems to be making to us: we ought to use dialectic philosophy. There are not specific moves to refute any opposing arguments against dialectic philosophy. Rather we are shown how philosophers who did not use dialectic philosophy , either properly or at all - are wrong about the first principles. Similarly, Aristotle presents no explicit arguments to affirm dialectic philosophy's validity, but rather presents dialectic philosophy as the method that we ought to use to discover the first principles. In other words, the persuasive element of the Metaphysics derives its power from its ethical implications, not its logical ones. These ethical implications are built into the Metaphysics in its Lexis and will be overlooked if all that is analyzed in the Metaphysics is its Logos.

Footnotes

1 This practice is the source of major controversy , the notion that philosophical texts can be reduced to argument form finds its roots in many of the works of Aristotle's Organon, specifically the Topics, the Categories, Prior and Posterior Analytics, etc.

2 This claim assumes that Andronicus, in his editions, remained accurate and faithful to the original texts of Aristotle.

3 Taken from the catalogue of Diogenes , it is interesting to keep in mind that certain major works are left out of the catalogue: On the Soul, the Parts of Animals, and the Generation of Animals.

4final cause

5 These books discuss the combination of the material cause with the essential cause.
- These are also foreshadowed in passages 986b:2-7(substance), 987b:1923 (essence), 988b:34-36 (essence).

6 This is indication for being an 'end-in-itself' because of the phrase "by nature." Aristotle does not offer this statement as a generalizing statement (e.g. "because most men desire to know, I am safe to say that all men desire to know"), but is rather a universal statement which can be demonstrated, but not proven.

7 By dialectic, I mean the system of proof using induction and apparent syllogism, which is discussed in Topics.

8 As characterized in book A. It is important to keep in mind that it is assumed that all of these individuals were wrong in their accounts according to Aristotle , that can be construed as the device which is used to bestow a sense of nobility to the project at hand.

9 Ross 692:982b 2-4, 28-33) and (Ross 693: 983b 7-10)

10 It is interesting to note the ethical implications of catharsis, in the sense that they, too, can be considered virtues. There is an implied statement of proper emotional response in the education theory of catharsis advanced by Jonathan Lear. The ability to be educated upon certain emotions indicates that these emotions may be experienced either too much, too little, or mediated to the proper amount.

11 I am using Truth in this case as a place holder for the concept "object for knowing."

12 (Ross 692:982b 2-4, 28-33) and (Ross 693: 983b 7-10)

13as discussed in the Posterior Analytics

14 cross apply (Lawson-Tancred 66:1354a)

15 "Epic poetry, then, has been seen to agree with Tragedy to this extent, that of being an imitation of serious subjects in a grand kind of verse. It differs however, (I) in that is in one kind of verse and in narrative form"(Bywater 1460:1450a 9-12)

16 It is interesting to note how, in an analysis of epic poetry, the "hero is often a twinz" (Britannica 6:907), just as rhetoric has its counterpart in dialectic.

17 When I say "acts morally," I mean it in the sense that it achieves its own highest end. For Aristotle, the good is defined by its function: "for whatever has a function and [characteristic] action, seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true for a human beingz"(Irwin 15 1097b25)

18 By the way that this statement is enunciated in the Poetics, it may be safe to say that Aristotle means Character in this sentence differently than when he defines Character earlier in the piece. The immediate passage afterwards cites examples of tragedies without human characters.

19These tensions may also mirror the tensions between the skeptics and the sophists.

Bibliography

Aristotle. "Metaphysica." Trans. W.D. Ross. The Collected Works of Aristotle. Comp. And ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Randomhouse, 1941. 689-935

--. "De Poetica." Trans Ingram Bywater. The Collected Works of Aristotle. Comp. And ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Randomhouse, 1941. 1455-1487

--. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. and ed. Terrence Irwin. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1985

--. The Art of Rhetoric. Trans. and ed. Hugh Lawson-Trancred. New York: Penguin Publishing, 1991

Barnes, Jonathan. "Metaphysics." The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. New York: Cambridge Press, 1995. 66-109

Bittner, Rüdiger. "One Action." Essays on Aristotle's Poetics. Ed. Améliw Oskenberg Rorty. Princeton: Princeton Press, 1992. 97-111

Butcher, S.H. Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art. New York: Dover Publishing, 1951

Hutchinson, D.S. "Ethics." The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. New York: Cambridge Press, 1995. 195-233

Irwin, Terrence. Aristotle's First Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Lear, Jonathan. "Katharsis." Essays on Aristotle's Poetics. Ed. Améliw Oskenberg Rorty. Princeton: Princeton Press, 1992. 315-341

Nussbaum, Martha C. Love's Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.