Cognitive system s structure thought. They encompass our patterns of inference
as well as the types of evidence we require before forming a belief. Since patterns of inference and standards
of justification influence how we interpret the world around us, cognitive
processes reach into the core of how we think and perceive. We do not use one global system that guides
our thinking in every situation; instead, we use multiple, localized cognitive
systems as we are confronted with different tasks and needs. As this use is largely unconscious, we
likely cannot choose to use a particular cognitive system and then simply
begin using it. Cognitive systems
underlie decision-making; they are not the results of decisions. We can examine the systems we use, but
we cannot try out various systems to see which we prefer.
Richard
Nisbett and Lee Ross undertook such an examination when they experimented with subjects
to assess common inferential practices.
The results provide insight into our typical patterns of inference,
which can in turn be used to describe our cognitive systems. They found that we typically make basic
errors in the detection of covariation, a basic relationship between variables,
and we "often rely on poorly justified causal theories of questionable
origin and place too much emphasis in even those explanations prompted by
causal theories held with good justification" (Nisbett and Ross 1980:
137). People also "perform
many prediction tasks quite poorly both in the laboratory and in everyday life"
because of a lack of understanding of "fundamental statistical principles"
(Nisbett and Ross 1980: 165). We
are especially poor at theory maintenance and change: we will force evidence to
fit currently held theories and will persevere in beliefs that new evidence
plainly renders unwarranted. At
first glance, these inferential practices are strikingly bad, but they raise
important questions about what it is for such a practice to be good:
But the perseverance tendencies of subjects in
these experiments were so extreme as to force consideration of the possibility
that the traditional scientific standards may not apply. In particular, it seems possible that
the behavior of subjects, inappropriate as it is from the standpoint of
rationality in the inferential contexts studied, may arise from the pursuit of
important, higher order epistemic goals. (Nisbett and Ross 1980: 191)
Even though the inferential patterns discovered in
these experiments could be better at producing true beliefs, common reasoning
is nonetheless effective in daily life.
Perhaps there is some reason for these unexpected patterns of inference;
they may, for instance, be more economical. Yet our initial reaction is to write them off as bad
reasoning. How ought we to evaluate
such practices? Do they represent
bad or faulty cognitive systems? Even
supposing we could make the patterns of inference more rational, we first need
to know if we should do this. Are
more rational cognitive systems better than the ones used by these subjects?
In
The Fragmentation of Reason, Stephen Stich advocates treating cognitive
systems pragmatically as tools and judging them with regard to their efficacy
in achieving what we value. To
reach this conclusion, he denies that true belief is valuable. When something
is valued intrinsically, it is valued for itself: it is valued because it is
what it is and not because of any effects it might have. Something's being instrumentally
valuable, however, means that it is valuable as a means to some end. Stich insists that when we come to a
proper understanding of the nature of truth, we cease to find it either
intrinsically or instrumentally valuable.
I
aim to show that he does not adequately support this conclusion about truth's
lack of value and that his arguments for his standard of cognitive evaluation
rely upon this conclusion. I first
reconstruct Stich's account of truth before exploring its implications and his
objections to the value of true belief.
I then explain how all three objections rely upon faulty assumptions and
how his core theory of truth conflicts with two of his objections. Because this unfavorable evaluation of
his arguments casts doubt on his proposed standard for cognitive evaluation, I propose
a new standard that relies upon a different argument for treating cognitive
systems as tools.
Stich
begins by explaining the nature of belief. He thinks that "beliefs are real psychological states,"
and he also "embraces the so-called token-identity hypothesis" (1990:
103). In contrast to theories that
beliefs are explanatory constructs, Stich says they are real phenomena. But what type of phenomena are they? The token-identity hypothesis
identifies beliefs with brain-states: these patterns of neurological firings
are the real phenomena which we call beliefs. A brain-state cannot be identified with more than one
particular belief, and the occurrence of a type of brain-state in a particular
brain signals the possession of its equivalent belief. Because particular beliefs are
identified with brain-states, one brain-state type cannot represent different
beliefs in different situations.
Stich
thus thinks that beliefs are real, physically-based phenomena, with each
particular belief being identical to some particular neurophysiological
state. A belief can therefore be
thought of as a particular brain-state, and a different brain-state would
represent either a different belief or no belief. This is a physicalist conception of mind that takes some
states of the brain to be identical with beliefs, so that the mental is bonded
to the physical.
The difference between those brain-states that are also beliefs and
those other brain-states that are not beliefs is that "beliefs have semantic
properties. They are true or
false" (Stich 1990: 103-104). Yet
how can a brain-state, a mere firing of neurons, be true or false? Stich answers this question by linking
brain-states with truth conditions, which specify the circumstances under
which a belief is true.[ii] Brain-states obtain truth-values through
their connection to truth conditions, and brain-states that are not beliefs
lack truth-values because they lack this connection.
The
choice of truth conditions determines which beliefs are true and false. This important role opens up another
puzzle: Why is a particular belief connected to one truth condition and not to
another? How are the circumstances
specified for a brain-state's being true?
Stich cannot appeal here to the relation of truth conditions to truth
since they determine whether a belief is true. Imagine a person having brain-state Belief1 this past
Sunday. This brain-state is a
belief because it is true or false, and its truth-value is determined by its
connection to truth conditions. If
it is connected to truth conditions that require that the current day be Sunday
for the belief to be true, the belief would be true. If it is instead linked to truth conditions that require
that the day be Wednesday, the belief would be false. Because these truth conditions define truth for the belief, one
cannot choose between them by referring to truth. So why use one truth condition and not the other?
To
resolve this issue, Stich posits an "interpretation function" that
maps beliefs to truth conditions.
A belief's truth-value is determined by certain truth conditions because
these are assigned to it by the interpretation function; this mapping interprets brain-states into
truth conditions. The
interpretation function links brain-state Belief1 with some truth
condition, and if this truth condition is that today is Sunday, Belief1 is true.
A
function connects every element of a domain (beliefs) with some one element of
a range (truth conditions), but each element of the range can be connected with
more than one element of the domain. The function could link the truth
condition that today is Sunday with Belief1 and with other
beliefs, but Belief1 could only be linked to that one truth condition. The use of function implies that
every belief is associated with one truth condition, but any truth condition
may be associated with any number of beliefs.
A function may link Belief1 to the truth condition that today is Sunday, but
the particular linkage still seems arbitrary.
To clarify the connection between beliefs and truth conditions, Stich
must explain the particular function we use. He calls his theory of our interpretation function the causal/functional
theory, and he thinks it is "a familiar and justifiably
popular one" (1990: 106). To provide truth conditions for all beliefs, it relies upon
Tarski's theory of truth, by which the statement "Tom is standing on
a beach" is true if and only if Tom is standing on a beach.[iii]
A natural language sentence is
one actually uttered (e.g. "Tom is standing on a beach"), and a
meta-language sentence is one in which truth conditions are ascribed to a
natural language sentence (e.g. Tom is standing on a beach). The meta-language statement specifying
truth conditions for "Tom is standing on the beach" only works if
there are axioms stating, for instance, that "Tom" refers to Tom.
Such axioms are necessary for the relationship between the natural
language sentence and the meta-language sentence to be clear, but unless there
is a means of verifying or deriving them, these axioms become arbitrary connections. The Tarskian theory depends upon a list of axioms without offering
an account of "what it is to get these axioms right" (Stich 1990:
108).
Stich turns to a Kripkean causal theory of reference to avoid this
arbitrariness. [iv] He explains the references of words in
terms of causal chains that link words to their meaning-bestowing initial
baptisms. A word initially acquires
meaning by, for instance, someone explicitly pointing it out as referring
to a particular object. This
meaning is then passed on through people's use of the word, so my use is connected
to the referent in virtue of the causal chain stretching from my current use
back to the initial bestowal of meaning. For example, a baby is born and her parents dub her Alice.
My use of "Alice" is connected to this initial baptism through
chains of communication: I may have seen the word on a birth certificate,
or somebody may have told me the baby's name. Yet
there are many causal chains that end in my use of "Alice." There is a causal chain connecting "Alice"
to a picture in a book by Lewis Carroll, and there is another chain connecting
the word to a phone directory in which I saw it printed. Because there are many causal chains linking
words back to all sorts of objects and processes that we do not identify as
their referents, only causal chains of the right sort fix the referents of
our words. These causal chains
can justify the axioms required by Tarski's theory. So if "Tom" refers to Tom via
the right sort of causal chains, and if the components of "is standing
on a beach" refer in their way to is standing on a beach, then "Tom
is standing on a beach" is true if and only if Tom is standing on a beach.
Stich
completes his account of the interpretation function by "putting the
language inside the head" (1990: 109). By the Tarskian/Kripkean elements of the theory, words have
referents and sentences have truth conditions. If the sentence is a belief, then, by the aforementioned
token-identity hypothesis, the sentence is a brain-state. Imagine a computer designed to make
truth-claims and that uses electron-states as its storage medium. Now imagine a string of electron-states,
illustrating a sentence that is a belief and is stored as a brain-state. The computer first interprets the
electron-states as meaningful data in a manner analogous to the assignation of
reference through causal chains. The
computer, in its Tarskian equivalent, next runs the interpreted data through a
program to assign it truth conditions, and it then checks on these truth
conditions to determine truth-values.
The computer can therefore verify that it only encodes true beliefs, and
it encodes them in an electron script that does not directly have semantic
value. Natural language sentences
are associated with beliefs, and because Stich identifies beliefs with
brain-states, we can be said to store these sentences in some neurological
script in the brain. The
interpretation function's role is to specify truth conditions for these "cerebral
inscriptions" (Stich 1990: 109).
Belief1 is interpreted by identifying the causal chains
behind its components, and this meaning of "Today is Sunday" connects
it with the truth condition that Belief1 is true if and
only if today is Sunday. The
interpretation function fixes the reference of a belief through causal chains
and then connects the belief with the appropriate truth conditions.
The
first important implication of Stich's account of truth is that the
causal/functional interpretation function does not map all possible
brain-states on to truth conditions.
Returning to the computer analogy, imagine electron-states that are
unreadable: they are similar to the electron-states that acquire truth
conditions, but these cannot be interpreted into data and so do not have truth
conditions. There can also be
brain-states which are similar to beliefs, but which lack truth conditions -- both
these brain-states and beliefs are "belieflike," but only the latter
have truth conditions. The
causal/functional interpretation function does not operate over all of the
belieflike brain-states, for "the belieflike mental states [which Stich
uses interchangeably with brain-states] for which it provides a specification
of truth conditions constitute a small subset of the possible belieflike mental
states that a human or other organism might have" (Stich 1990:
110-111). While this
interpretation function does offer truth conditions for brain-states that are
beliefs, there are similar brain-states for which it fails to provide such
conditions.
Stich
says this limitation is due to its causal theory of reference and to its formal
requirements. By the Kripkean
theory of reference, a given word is connected to its referent via a causal
chain stretching from the word's initial baptism to the word as it stands in
the lexicon of the current speaker.
Because there are many different causal chains connecting a word to
different things, the reference-fixing causal chains must be of a particular
type. So, Stich's argument runs,
because a word is tied to the world in many different ways, a word could end up
in the speaker's lexicon while lacking the type of causal chain that the
causal/functional interpretation function takes as fixing reference. For example, the word "Bish"
may have entered my lexicon by my seeing a newspaper's misprint of the caption
under a picture of a world leader.
My use of the word can be accounted for by the causal chain connecting
it to the misprint, but this causal chain is not of the Kripkean type, since it
lacks an appropriate initial baptism at its foundation. Because "Bish" does not have any Kripkean causal
chain by which it gains a referent, "Bish" does not refer when I use
it. Stich thinks that Kripkean
causal chains are not necessary for a word to end up in a person's
lexicon. Because they lack the
appropriate sorts of causal ropes, these hypothetical non-Kripkean words do not
refer, and the causal/functional interpretation function will not assign truth
conditions to sentences which contain these words. Any belief of mine that uses "Bish" will be
neither true nor false since it will be meaningless. The domain of this interpretation function is restricted to
those words that are tied to the world via the proper sort of causal chains.
The
other limitation to this interpretation function stems from its formal
requirements. This function only
assigns truth conditions to certain types of syntactical relations. Relations such as conjunctions and
counterfactuals have "patterns of inference" which are "intuitively
logically permissible" (Stich 1990: 113): a conjunction is a syntactical
relationship that leads to predictable inferences which we intuitively
understand. Stich says there are
other syntactical relationships among sentences that are not so easily understood:
There are indefinitely many possible patterns of
formally specifiable causal interactions among mental sentences and thus
indefinitely many possible mental sentence constructions, which admit of no
intuitively plausible semantic interpretation at all. Most purely formal, syntactically
characterizable patterns of interaction among sentences or well-formed formulas
have no intuitively plausible semantics. (1990: 113)
Many relations can be derived from syntactical
rules, but they may not be explainable as true or false. Stich offers the example of the
construction 'p {} q', for which two premises 'p' and 'q' are related by 'p {}
q' if and only if the first contains more conjuncts than the second, the second
contains fewer disjuncts that the first, or both begin with certain abstruse symbols
(1990: 113). We know how to derive
'p {} q' from a pair of premises, but it is not clear what it means for 'p {} q'
to be true or false. Given the two
premises "The dog ate my homework or I forgot it" and "I swim
well," we can derive "The dog ate my homework or I forgot it {} I
swim well," because "I swim well" contains fewer disjuncts. But how can we interpret this derivation
in terms of truth conditions?
Because the axioms necessary for the meta-language sentence to make
sense of the connective {} are not as easily created as for a conjunction, it
does not make much sense to say, "'The dog ate my homework or I forgot it
{} I swim well' is true if and only if the dog ate my homework or I forgot it
{} I swim well." The
truth-value of this syntactic construction cannot be explained in terms of the
causal/functional interpretation function. This function's Tarskian basis limits its domain to
connectives whose semantics are intuitively understandable.
The causal/functional interpretation
function therefore has a limited domain: many belieflike brain-states
are not assigned truth conditions because of the function's restrictions on how
a word refers and on which connectives are allowable. This limited domain implies that there are many
computational systems whose components lack truth conditions. Stich observes that these systems may
be more helpful than ones we currently use:
No doubt many of the systems in this semantics-free
space are useless and chaotic. But
there is certainly no reason to suppose that they all are. A much more likely possibility is that
in this huge space there are systems that would vastly increase their user's
power or happiness or biological fitness, systems that would lead to
substantial reductions in the amount of suffering in the universe, and systems
that would significantly reduce the probability that we will bomb ourselves
into oblivion along with much of the biosphere. (1990: 118-119)
Truth-based cognitive systems do not utilize many
belieflike brain-states, but cognitive systems that are not so tightly linked
to truth can utilize them. Some of
these cognitive systems may be substantially more beneficial than the truth-based
ones we use.
Because
these other cognitive systems are not concerned with truth, valuing truth
creates a reticence in people to consider them. Regarding our pursuit of these other cognitive systems, Stich
says, "Those who would accord intrinsic value to the holding of true
beliefs may well be reluctant to explore that vast space and will resist
adopting what may be found, since we know in advance that it contains no true
beliefs. But theirs is a
profoundly conservative normative stand" (1990: 119). Even though these other systems may have
effects that better accord with our values such as happiness, those who value
true belief for its own sake will not want to explore these semantically-free
systems, because they by definition will not lead to true beliefs. The belieflike states these systems
emphasize are neither true nor false.
Calling
this "a profoundly conservative normative stand," Stich admits that
some extreme traditionalists may actually find their valuation reinforced by
the discovery of truth's conservative nature (1990: 120). He also, however, believes that "there
are many people, and I am among them, who are not much inclined to value what
is traditional and familiar for its own sake in matters epistemic" (1990:
120). Because clinging to the
value of truth precludes the possibility of advancing other values through non-semantic
cognitive systems, Stich thinks the only reason to continue to value truth is
an excessive valuation of tradition.
In
addition to having a limited domain, the causal/functional interpretation
function is also "highly idiosyncratic" (Stich 1990: 114). This function maps beliefs on to truth
conditions, so Belief1 is mapped on to the truth condition that today is
Sunday and Belief2 is mapped on to the truth condition that today is
Wednesday. This mapping can be
switched, however, so that Belief1 is true if and
only if today is Wednesday and Belief2 is true if and
only if today is Sunday. Mapping
beliefs to truth conditions in one way means that they can be mapped in many
other ways (Stich 1990: 114). If
every belief is connected to a truth condition, these connections can be
switched around to create different mappings. The causal/functional interpretation function does not
provide the only possible mapping.
One
way to differentiate between these alternative mappings is to focus on the
causal chains used to fix reference.
The causal/functional interpretation function upon which we rely only
respects Kripkean causal chains as reference-fixing, yet "what ties all
these [Kripkean] causal chains together is not any substantive property that
they all share. Rather, what ties
them together is that commonsense intuition counts them all as reference-fixing
chains" (Stich 1990: 115). Aside
from my using them to fix reference, the chains connecting my use of "Alice"
with the naming of the baby and my use of "Bush" with the naming of
the president do not have a common property not shared by the chains connecting
"Alice" and "Bish" with the pictures in the Carroll book
and the newspaper. The only
difference between them is that we do indeed use the first two chains to fix
reference. Our only reason for
using these is that our intuition identifies them as the proper types of causal
chains for fixing reference.
Many
different non-Kripkean causal chains may be used by other reference schemes, "and
the only obvious complaint to lodge against many of these alternative schemes
is that they do not happen to be the scheme sanctioned by our commonsense
intuition" (Stich 1990: 115).
The only feature that distinguishes causal chains sanctioned by the
Kripkean account of reference from other chains is that this version of reference
happens to be the one we use. This,
in Stich's view, makes valuing the results of the causal/functional
interpretation function idiosyncratic.
It
is quite difficult to construct a non-Kripkean reference relation that we might
plausibly employ. Perhaps this
lack of plausibility indicates that Kripkean causal chains have a greater
family resemblance than Stich allows them. One example of an alternative reference relation emphasizes
the causal chains connecting proper names with the people who introduced them
to us. So, for instance, some parents
name their baby Alice, and when I meet the family a few years later, the mother
introduces her child to me as Alice.
Under the Kripkean reference scheme, my use of "Alice" will
refer to the child, but under this alternative reference scheme, my use of "Alice"
will refer to the mother. If, in
the future, I believe that Alice eats cereal, the truth-value of the belief may
depend on which reference relation I use.
The truth condition arrived at via the Kripkean reference relation will
make my belief true if and only if the child eats cereal, but the truth
condition led to by this alternate reference relation will make my belief true
if and only if the mother eats cereal.
I
will call such alternate reference relations reference*, and they explain how
words refer*. To differentiate the
causal/functional theory's reference relation from reference*, I will designate
it by reference^. Reference* leads
to truth* conditions, and reference^ leads to truth^ conditions. For Stich, the result of the
causal/functional interpretation function is the assignation of truth^-values
to beliefs to make them true^ or false^, and the results of other
interpretation functions than the one we use are truth*-values for beliefs to
make them true* or false*. I will
henceforth use "truth," "falsity," "reference,"
and their cognates as purposefully vague notions, in contrast to the marked
words that indicate particular interpretation functions and their results.
With
reference* as defined in the above example, should we use the causal/functional
interpretation function, or should we use the interpretation function through
which words refer*? Stich does not
think either function has any distinctive features that should lead us to
regard one or the other more highly.
In fact, he believes that the only significant
difference is that reference^ is the relation we happen to use. Truth^ and truth* differ only in their
reference relations, and because there is no significant difference between the
relations, a preference for truth^ must be idiosyncratic. One who values truth^ would do so solely
because the causal/functional interpretation function is the one tradition
leads us to use.
This
idiosyncrasy leads Stich to again designate intrinsically valuing truth^ as a
conservative position. He says
that our use of the Kripkean reference relation is not the result of an
informed decision:
Whatever the explanation [for why we sanction this
particular interpretation function], it is clear that our intuitions do not
result from a systematic and critical assessment of the many alternative
interpretation functions and the various virtues that each may have. One way or another, we have simply
inherited our intuitions; we have not made a reflective choice to have them.
(1990: 120)
Most people who currently value true^ belief never
consider the other options. In a
world with many alternatives to truth^, we ought to decide which is best for us
rather than simply accepting the one we inherit. Yet people who reflect on the options and still value truth
are not much better, for "they are making a profoundly conservative
choice; they are letting tradition determine their cognitive values without any
attempt at critical evaluation of that tradition" (Stich 1990: 120). The existence of equally commendable
alternatives reduces the attractiveness of sticking by the intrinsic value of
truth^. Were we to reflect on all
the options for interpretation functions and to choose one, we would not have
an obvious means of choosing one because of their lack of distinguishing
features. Stich faults those who
currently value truth^ for doing so unreflectively, and the value of truth^ is
lessened for those who do reflect on it because the function that provides
truth^ conditions is merely one pedestrian function among many.
In
attempting to overturn the value of true belief, Stich must also consider the
claim that it has instrumental value.
We use the causal/functional interpretation function to arrive at
truth^-values, but there are many possible interpretation functions, through which
we aim at true* beliefs, true** beliefs, and the like. Stich uses this insight to raise the
bar for the advocates of the instrumental value of truth^. Not only must they show that true^
beliefs are more instrumentally valuable than false^ ones, but these beliefs
must also be measured against true* beliefs, true** beliefs, and their kin. A simple comparison with falsity^ will
not suffice, because there are other options that are neither strictly true^
nor false^. Some true* beliefs may
also be true^, others may be false^, and still others may have no truth^
conditions and so will be "neither true[^] nor false[^]" (Stich 1990:
121). To be instrumentally
valuable, truth^ must be better than these other options at promoting valuable
ends.
Stich
says that true^ beliefs do not always represent "the
best way to achieve our more fundamental goals"
(1990: 122). As an example of a
case in which true* belief would have been more instrumentally valuable, he
describes a person dying in a plane crash. If he had possessed a true* belief about the departure time [where
true* belief agrees with true^ belief entirely except that in this one case the
true* belief is false^ (Stich 1990: 123)], this person would have avoided the
crash and so saved his life. From
this story, Stich concludes that "true beliefs are not always optimal in the pursuit of
happiness or pleasure or desire satisfaction, nor are they always the best
beliefs to have if what we want is peace or power or love, or some weighted mix
of all of these" (1990: 123, italics added). Sometimes it would be better to have false^ beliefs which
are true* than to have true^ beliefs.
Stich knows of no argument that attempts to show that true^ beliefs do a
better job than these other options "in general, or in the
long run" (1990: 123). Since we know that truth^ is not always preferable, he thinks
it a difficult task to show that it is even generally preferable to all other
options. Since some other options
may be more efficacious, Stich thinks it doubtful that truth^ has instrumental
value.
Stich
freely admits that the above objections to the value of true belief have been presented
against "the background assumption that the causal/functional
interpretation function is the right one" (1990: 124). He must now attempt to demonstrate the
applicability of his arguments to any plausible account of truth, so that the
strength of his position does not depend upon the adequacy of his particular description
of the casual/functional interpretation function. He wants to show that any alternative account must share the
key features that overturn the value of truth for the causal/functional theory. His two arguments against the intrinsic
value of truth follow from the limited domain of the causal/functional
interpretation function and from the idiosyncrasy of valuing it, and his attack
on the instrumental value of truth relies upon the efficacy of alternatives to
truth.
For
an account of truth^ to be plausible, Stich requires that it meet our
commonsense intuitions about truth; any theory that does not meet these
intuitions is deemed implausible. Yet
our commonsense intuitions say nothing about many possible cognitive systems
which depart radically from anything yet imagined. Also, there are infinitely many syntactically possible
connectives about which our intuition is totally silent. Since a plausible account of truth is
restricted to our intuitions, Stich concludes that it must share the limited
domain of the causal/functional interpretation function. This limited domain leads to his
accusations of conservatism and thus overturns the intrinsic value of truth for
any version of the interpretation function.
The
idiosyncrasy of valuing the results of the causal/functional interpretation
function derives from two factors: that cultural influences play a significant
role in determining which function we use, and that there are many alternatives
to it. Because the culturally
inherited notions that lead us towards a given interpretation function are only
sanctioned by "tradition" (Stich 1990: 126), the function chosen is
also only sanctioned by tradition.
He thinks it unlikely that it has any distinguishing feature or that it
was chosen on the basis of such a feature. Because there will always be alternatives to any interpretation
function, and because the retention of our inherited function would only be
guided by culturally inherited notions regardless of the specific description
of the function, the idiosyncrasy implied by the causal/functional theory is
generalizable to any plausible account.
The resultant attack on the intrinsic value of truth is therefore also
generalizable to any plausible account of truth.
Regarding
his objection to truth's instrumental value, the first key point is that true^
belief is instrumentally valuable only if it is more efficacious than false^
belief and all versions of true* belief.
Truth* and its ilk are developed through alternative accounts of
reference, and there will be many alternative functions providing alternative
versions of truth regardless of whichever particular function best accords with
intuition. Any account of the
interpretation function would still require one to compare truth with truth*,
and this leads to the downfall of true belief.
Stich's
other key point is that there are circumstances in which true^ beliefs are not
the most efficacious: true* beliefs sometimes promote survival better. Because "for any interpretation
function to be in the running, it must match up with commonsense intuition, at
least most of the time," the example already described of the person
catching the doomed plane would hold under any plausible interpretation
function (Stich 1990: 125). However
the interpretation function that we use is explained, the traveler's belief
must be true, for he believed that the plane would leave at the time it did in
fact leave. A plausible account of
the interpretation function that we use could not stray far enough from our
intuitions to preclude the construction of such counterexamples that provide
instances of truth serving us more poorly than would truth*.
The
success of Stich's objections to the value of truth is crucial to his proposal
for the evaluation of cognitive systems.
He uses truth's lack of value to reject other proposals, and this in
turn enables him to present his own.
The first proposal is that of analytic epistemology. In brief, for Stich, analytic
epistemology would seek to analyze commonsense epistemic notions in order to
elicit "criteria of rightness" that establish right "justification
rules" (1990: 91-92), and these justification rules would determine which
cognitive systems are good. He
first argues against the intrinsic value of such a "right" cognitive
system on the basis of the cultural nature and variability of our commonsense
notions. Stich then must overturn such
a system's instrumental value. To
do this, he feels that he must reject the value of true belief, so he can thereby
counter any appeal to the ability of these cognitive processes to generate true
beliefs.
From
the alleged collapse of the solution of analytic epistemology, Stich concludes
that cognitive systems should be evaluated on whether "the consequences of employing one
alternative or the other will lead to something we value" (1990:
130). The "obvious" position
suggests that cognitive systems are good insofar as they produce true beliefs
and avoid falsehoods (Stich 1990: 130).
Yet because "a consequentialist account must take as the relevant
consequences something that people actually value" (Stich 1990: 131), true
belief's lack of value means that it cannot be the ultimate criterion.
Because
Stich is concerned with consequences, he proposes to view cognitive systems
pragmatically as tools. We ought
to evaluate these systems in terms of the agreement of their consequences with
our values. As an admittedly
problematic example, he describes a cost-benefit analysis in which we assign
values to the systems' outcomes and choose the ones that maximizes the expected
value (1990: 133-134). The
evaluation of a cognitive system is relative to the user (Stich 1990: 136); it
is relative to "the environment in which the system is operating"
(Stich 1990: 136); and it is relative to "the purpose of inquiry"
(Stich 1990: 155). The judgment of
cognitive systems depends upon what the prospective cognizer values, the
circumstances in which she will be using the systems, and her objective in
making the decision.
Stich
labels his position "epistemic pragmatism." He does not see cognitive systems as valuable in themselves;
instead, they are valuable as means to ends. To be better than another option, a cognitive system must be
more efficacious in promoting desirable ends. Cognitive systems are tools whose normative status depends
upon their ability to produce effects that cohere with our values.
The
limited domain of the causal/functional interpretation function gives rise to
Stich's first objection to the intrinsic value of truth. Many cognitive systems that would
benefit us may not be concerned with truth. Because valuing truth makes us disinclined to explore these
other cognitive systems, it is a conservative position. This argument relies upon a correlation
between valuing and consideration: Stich assumes that valuing truth means that
we will only consider cognitive systems that employ truth. He leaves no room for the possibility
that one can consider the other benefits of a non-semantically-based cognitive
system while valuing truth. This move
requires the assumption that if truth is valuable, it must be of highest value
in all circumstances. In this
case, the possible benefits of these other cognitive systems would never be of
sufficient weight to distract us from the pursuit of true belief. If the value of true belief is not of this
highest type, however, supporting it is not incompatible with favorably evaluating
non-truth-based cognitive systems. We could value truth while approving of cognitive systems that
do not use truth. Only if we value
truth in this highest manner will we demand that a good cognitive system
utilize truth regardless of whatever other benefits it may bring.[v]
Stich
believes that most people would cease to value truth if they understood its
nature. In this first attack, he
argues that people's recognition that they are ignoring beneficial cognitive
systems would cause people to cease to value truth intrinsically. Stich's argument is unsound, however,
because of the key assumption. Rejecting
the assumption, and so denying that true belief must be of overriding value, would
not result in the conservative stance described by Stich. There is no reason why the value of
true belief could not be occasionally outweighed by the value of survival, of
health, or of pleasure. These represent
important motivations that may also be ingrained in the human condition. If true belief can be comparable to some
other values, then one who values it need not be so reluctant to consider
non-semantic cognitive systems.[vi] Stich requires a false disjunction
between granting truth highest value or no value, and the failure of this
disjunction leads to the failure of his argument.
Stich
could reply that valuing true belief does not prevent us from considering
non-truth-based cognitive systems, but it precludes us from such
consideration. As truth-valuers,
we want to have true beliefs about cognitive systems when we evaluate them. Working from within the context of a
truth-based cognitive system, however, we know that we can never acquire true
belief about these systems. They
are too foreign to our own thinking to be accurately conceptualized. Valuing truth therefore prevents us
from ever seriously evaluating these cognitive systems because we can never
feel up to the task.
&nbs