The Use and Abuse of Dionysus:
Testing Nietzsche against His Standards
I.
Introduction
The study of ancient Greek mythology easily seduces
me, filling my imagination with thoughts of mysticism, disputing gods,
mortal and divine love affairs, curses, sacrifice, devotion to nature,
superstitions, dream revelations, tragedy, obscure oracles, and undying
passion and fear of the gods. Greek mythology charmed Nietzsche,
as well, who alludes to the mysterious gods throughout his philosophical
authorship. My project seeks to analyze Nietzsche’s philosophical
attraction to Greek mythology and evaluate the validity of his philosophical
treatment of mythological history. The Greek god Dionysus is a
central figure throughout Nietzsche’s work, notably in The
Birth of Tragedy, Beyond
Good and Evil, and Twilight
of the Idols. It becomes clear that Nietzsche cherishes ancient
Greek culture and recommends his fellow men to join in his discipleship
of Dionysus. Arguably, the represented Dionysus figure changes
throughout the progression and development of Nietzsche’s thought.
I ask the reader to attend cautiously to the evolving Dionysus and to
examine Nietzsche’s philosophical use of history. He offers
a creative approach to history and its detail in the essay, The Use
and Abuse of History, proposing standards that allow the abstraction
of selected actual instances or figures of history to suit one’s
philosophical purposes, but he ultimately contradicts these principles
through his inventive development of the Dionysus figure.
After evaluating Nietzsche’s treatment of the proper use of history,
I establish Nietzsche’s historical inaccuracy, and question his
license to do so. Nietzsche fails to account for the actual instance
of the worship of Dionysus, and rather creates the god anew in his developed
thought. Nietzsche’s distortion of Dionysus weakens his
avid recommendation to join in his discipleship of the god, and destroys
the historical justifications of his project through violation of his
own historical principles.
II.
Nietzsche’s First Depiction of Dionysus
Nietzsche introduces Dionysus into his philosophy with
his first book The Birth of Tragedy, as a god of opposing force
against Apollo. The battling dual of Dionysus, the Greek god of
music, and Apollo, the Greek god of sculpture, makes up the “continuous
development of art,” in which the harmonious coupling of the opposed
gods gives history the attic tragedy (33). To illustrate the opposition
of the two gods, Nietzsche gives the reader access to the state of Apollo
through a dream analogy, and to Dionysus through an intoxication analogy.
The Dionysian emotions of “intoxication” allow subjectivity
and self-awareness to vanish “into complete self-forgetfulness,”
thus revealing the “glowing life” of those who revel in
the Dionysian state of being (BOT [1] 36-37). That is to say, those who embrace
and accept the Dionysian state of being noticeably glow with liveliness.
The Dionysian state is “an artistic energy which bursts forth
from nature herself, without the meditation of the human artist,”
so the Dionysian state is not manifested by human reflection or deliberation,
but by nature’s untamed and uncivilized energies. In the
Dionysian state, the human being is the object of these energies: “He
is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art,” free from
self-reflection and awareness (BOT 37). The Dionysian powers of
nature can be thought of as the artist, and its subject, this “intoxicated”
and “unaware” man unified with nature. And under such
a spell of the Dionysian, as man’s self-awareness deflates into
nothingness, unity among man and nature is reconciled (BOT 37).
Conversely, in his self-aware, Apollinian state, man is horrified and
alienated from nature, but in his “intoxicated” Dionysian
state, man is unified with nature and expresses himself, perhaps unconsciously
through song and dance, as a member of a higher community in company
of the music god Dionysus (BOT 37). This “intoxicated reality”
goes further than unifying man with nature; the Dionysian state “even
seeks to destroy the individual and redeem him by a mystic feeling of
oneness” (BOT 38). Man experiences a kind of death and rebirth
from a state of separateness into a state of unity and oneness.
Man is destroyed and redeemed by Dionysus, so Nietzsche writes.
The god Dionysus was worshipped in festivals, first by barbarians living
outside of Greece, and eventually, despite Apollinian opposition, the
worship filtered into the country of Greece. Nietzsche describes
these festivals centered around “extravagant sexual licentiousness”
or sexual recklessness (BOT 39). He claims, “savage natural
instincts were unleashed, including even that horrible mixture of sensuality
and cruelty,” a kind of excitement and pleasure that might border
on the edge of disgust and pain, activities which indeed overwhelmed
the values and traditions of Greek family life (BOT 39). Dionysian
attitudes and lifestyles contained certain wildness and rebelliousness
from the norm of Greek life, and fear accompanied the sober one who
witnessed or heard of those Dionysian revelers in all their “glow.”
The Dionysian state is not one of rationality or clarity; rather, it
welcomes and embraces the eternal suffering and contradictions in life’s
reality, sufferings which are quite painful and even nauseating (BOT
45).
Such description of the contradictions of Dionysus returns Nietzsche’s
thought to the Apollinian and Dionysian duality, the sides of which
are “necessarily” interdependent (BOT 45). Dionysian
truth and contradiction is a reality of life, so man must have an illusory
comfort to endure the harsh Dionysian realities of life, and such illusory
comforts are the Apollinian dreams and images. Man must have the
image or dream illusion of Apollo in order to withstand the brutal,
contradictory, and painful truth of Dionysus. Apollo acts as man’s
“redemption through mere appearance” from the pain of Dionysian
truth (BOT 45). The Apollinian illusions are necessary for the
Dionysian truth-seeker to function in the world because “true
knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth, outweighs any motive
for action” (BOT 60). So what can the informed, knowing
Dionysian man do at this point? How can he continue to live and
take action in life if he has become paralyzed by the disgust of truth?
The Dionysian man turns to art as “a saving sorceress, expert
at healing. She alone knows how to turn these nauseas thoughts
about the horror or absurdity of existence into notions with which one
can live” (BOT 60). This saving sorceress called art is
a manifestation of the Apollinian impulse that exists harmoniously with
the Dionysian, harmonious in the sense that both dueling states are
needed for man to exist truthfully in the world. One must experience
painful Dionysian contradictions and sufferings if one seeks truth,
and one must therefore, use the comfort and aid of the Apollinian illusions
if one wishes to function in the world while occasionally experiencing
the horrors of truth, which are manifestations of the Dionysian.
Nietzsche illustrates the harmony that exists between the duality of
Dionysus and Apollo in his theory of “the origin of tragedy.”
The relationship between performers and spectators of ancient Greek
drama is very different from the relationship between performers and
spectators that exists today and in Nietzsche’s day. The
spectator of the ancient tragedy became one with the drama, and such
unity is comparable to a Dionysian experience of “oneness”
with one’s surrounding environment. The spectator relinquishes
his self-awareness and imagines “in absorbed contemplation, that
he himself was a chorist” (BOT 63). This experience
of oneness with the chorus and the spirits of the drama is a “Dionysian
excitement,” which rouses the audience to a Dionysian state of
unity, relinquishing all subjectivity, in preparation for the staging
of the tragic hero, so that “when the tragic hero appeared on
stage, they did not see the awkwardly masked human being but rather
a visionary figure, born as it were from their own rapture” (BOT
64/66). Nietzsche calls such experience, from conscientious, Apollinian
sobriety to Dionysian ecstasy, a transformation: “In this magical
transformation the Dionysian reveler sees himself as a satyr, and as
a satyr, in turn, he sees the god, which means that in his metamorphosis
he beholds another vision outside himself, as the Apollinian complement
of his own state” (BOT 64). The Apollinian visions complete
the Dionysian frenzy by enabling the ecstatic man to behold a vision
of Dionysus; thus, the gods share a “necessarily” complementary
nature because the frenzied Dionysian man cannot behold a vision of
his god without Apollo’s influence, which enables man to conscientiously
experience his visions.
Nietzsche uses the myth of Dionysus, that he was torn to pieces as a
boy by the Titans, and was then reborn to Demeter, to explain the “agonies
of individuation” (BOT 73). Dionysus’ coming into
being is the root cause of his suffering, his individuation is the reason
for his dismemberment by the Titans, and “we are therefore to
regard the state of individuation as the origin and primal cause of
all suffering, as something objectionable in itself” (BOT 73).
The dismembered state of Dionysus lends him to a dualistic nature, one
of “a cruel, barbarized demon” and the other of “a
mild, gentle ruler” (BOT 73). Again, Nietzsche supports
his claim of the contradictory qualities of Dionysian truth. This
myth of the death and rebirth of Dionysus gives way to a feeling of
hope that Dionysus exudes, that the Greeks hope for his return (BOT
74). Dionysus is described as a god who undergoes a death and
a rebirth, a notion entailed within his myth.
In The Birth of Tragedy, the reader quickly grasps Nietzsche’s
admiration for the ancient Greeks, and especially his admiration of
the worship of Dionysus. Nietzsche describes the ancients as the
models of all succeeding cultures in time and as those who sincerely
value truth in the face of its pain. Succeeding cultures, unfortunately,
do not live up the greatness of the Greek way of life:
And so one feels ashamed and afraid in the presence
of the Greeks, unless one prizes truth above all things and dares acknowledge
even this truth: that the Greeks, as charioteers, hold in their hands
the reins of our own and every other culture, but that almost always
chariot and horses are of inferior quality and not up to the glory of
their leaders, who consider it sport to run such a team into an abyss
which they themselves clear with the leap of Achilles. (94)
Succeeding cultures are
always “inferior in quality” to the Greeks. The Greeks
are risk-takers, ruthless truth seekers aware of the pain and genuine
joy that truth often invites into one’s life. So Nietzsche’s
message seems to be clear, that the best way of life is the ancient
Greek way of life, and we would do ourselves a great service by returning
to such a Golden Age, most notable, an age that worshipped the music
god Dionysus.
Nietzsche invites his readers to proclaim a kind of rebirth of
tragedy through rebirth of Dionysus:
Yes, my friends, believe with me in Dionysian life
and the rebirth of tragedy. Put on your wreaths of ivy, put the
thyrsus into your hand, and do not be surprised when tigers and panthers
lie down, fawning, at your feet. Only dare to be tragic men; for
you are to be redeemed. You shall accompany the Dionysian pageant
from India to Greece. Prepare yourselves for hard strife, but
believe in the miracles of your god. (BOT 124)
In this passage Nietzsche
addresses man’s potential unity with nature if he follows Dionysus.
Man will be glorious, but man must “dare” to choose such
glory. It will not be a simple and easy task to follow Dionysus.
Man must be prepared for “strife;” man can, however, also
expect joyful miracles from this god. Again Nietzsche confronts
redemption of man, implying hopefulness for man and his former down-trodden
state of being, and such redemption is captured in the myth of Dionysus,
telling of his miraculous rebirth after a horrible and gruesome dismemberment,
again emphasizing the pain of individuation.
III.
The Fusion of Dionysus and Apollo
Throughout his authorship, Nietzsche next mentions the
frenzied, uncontrollable god in the end of his book, Beyond Good
and Evil, but the god’s identity has arguably changed into
a synthesis of the Apollinian and Dionysian forces described in The
Birth of Tragedy.
[2] In Section 295 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche
describes the philosophy of Dionysus to his readers, expressing his
intention: “And I suppose I might begin at long last to offer
you, my friends, a few tastes of this philosophy” (235).
The following explication of Section 295 will demonstrate both the Dionysian
and Apollinian attributes assigned to the revised Dionysus since his
original introduction in The Birth of Tragedy. Upon examination
of the Dionysus presented in Beyond Good and Evil, I will first cite descriptions that are consistent
with those of The Birth of Tragedy,
then I will cite descriptions of Dionysus that would seem to be Apollinian,
concluding that Nietzsche merges Apollinian and Dionysian characteristics
into one figure called Dionysus in Beyond Good and Evil.
In Section 295 of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche
calls Dionysus “the tempter god…whose voice knows how to
descend into the netherworld of every soul” (233). According
to The Birth of Tragedy characterizations, Dionysus is a tempter
god of “sexual licentiousness” able to descend into the
uncomfortable depths or “netherworld” of the soul in search
of brutal truth. In The Birth of Tragedy, Dionysus promotes
destruction of the individual and unity among man and nature.
Further in Section 295 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes
of the man who has been touched by Dionysus, that he “walks away
richer…broken open, blown at and sounded out by a thawing wind,
perhaps more unsure…more broken, but full of hopes that as yet
have no name, full of new will and currents, full of new dissatisfaction
and undertows” (234). Again, these depictions of Dionysus
remain consistent with those of Nietzsche’s first book.
The painful discovery of Dionysian truth breaks man open to a new depth
of existence, his comfort level is torn apart, he is unfamiliar and
uncertain of the new, truer territory into which he has plunged; yet,
he remains hopeful, as addressed in The Birth of Tragedy, of
the return of Dionysus after his dismemberment. In the Dionysian
state, man is beyond the restraints of language; thus, there is yet
“no name” or articulation of his experience. Nietzsche
teases his audience asking them of whom he speaks, and then writes,
“Have I forgotten myself so far that I have not even told you
his name?” (BGE 234) The idea of forgetting the self is
indeed Dionysian, supporting The Birth of Tragedy notion of destroying
the individual, which is the source of pain and suffering, in order
to unify with nature. After identifying Dionysus in Beyond
Good and Evil, Nietzsche calls him “that great ambiguous one”
whose philosophy “concerns much that is secret, new, strange,
odd, uncanny” (234-235). All such depictions are consistent
with the contradictory Dionysus in The Birth of Tragedy.
Nietzsche, after proclaiming himself “the last disciple and initiate
of the god Dionysus,” speaks of the god’s ambition toward
human beings, that Dionysus wishes for man to become stronger, more
evil, and more beautiful (BGE 235-236). The thought of man accomplishing
such severe character traits as evilness and brute strength, while simultaneously
becoming more beautiful exemplifies Dionysian contradiction, which is
spoken of in The Birth of Tragedy. Dionysian beauty is
not necessarily sweet and gentle, but likely painful and abrasive.
The previous citations of Dionysus in Beyond Good and Evil correlate
with the characterization of the god in Nietzsche’s first book.
In this text, however, Nietzsche arguably synthesizes Apollinian qualities
with Dionysian ones.
The following are Apollinian characteristics Nietzsche assigns
to Dionysus in the same Section 295 of Beyond Good and Evil,
from which we can deduce that Nietzsche’s developed Dionysus has
become a synthesis of the two opposed gods in The Birth of Tragedy.
In addition to naming Dionysus a “tempter god” in Beyond
Good and Evil, Nietzsche assigns
him Apollinian characteristics:
The born pied piper of consciences…whose mastery
includes the knowledge of how to seem—not what he is but what
is to those who follow him…in order to follow him ever more inwardly
and thoroughly—the genius of the heart who silences all that is
loud and self-satisfied, teaching it to listen; who smoothes rough souls
and lets them taste a new desire—to lie still as a mirror, that
the deep sky may mirror itself in them—the genius of the heart
who teaches the doltish and rash hand to hesitate and reach out more
delicately. (233)
The skill of Dionysus to
“seem” a certain way in order to serve an ulterior purpose,
specifically, to be followed in a more inward and thorough manner, is
unquestionably an Apollinian feature. As Nietzsche originally
communicates, it is the conscientious Apollo who masters the skill of
seeming, or appearing in a desired manner. Yet in this passage,
Nietzsche claims that Dionysus is the “pied piper of consciences,”
whose followers become more inward, reflective people. In this
passage Nietzsche contradicts his original assertions of Apollo and
Dionysus from The Birth of Tragedy by assigning Apollinian features
to Dionysus, who formerly opposed Apollo, which could be problematic
for Nietzsche’s thought. To claim that Dionysus “silences
all that is loud…teaching it to listen,” smoothing “rough
souls,” contradicts the original description of Dionysus in Nietzsche’s
first book. In The Birth of Tragedy, it is Apollo, not
Dionysus, who maintains order and opposes chaos. Apollo is the
inner-reflective god who would have lied “still as a mirror”
and taught the “doltish and rash…to hesitate and reach out
more delicately,” or to become gentler and more thoughtful in
their ways. One served Apollo by following the creed to “Know
thyself,” which is conscientious and reflective, but certainly
not Dionysian. Dionysus, as explained in The Birth of Tragedy,
would have been the “rough soul” and “the doltish
and rash hand,” not the mirror or teacher. More evidence
of a changed or developed Dionysus includes Nietzsche’s dialogue
with the god. Nietzsche writes that the god often reflects on
how he might advance mankind (BGE 236). The original depiction
of Dionysus is not a reflective being, but he actually opposes reflection
and advocates chaotic, unaware frenzy. This evidence settles that
Nietzsche has changed the disposition of Dionysus in Beyond Good
and Evil since The Birth of Tragedy.
Is Nietzsche able to take such advances with a historical figure in
his philosophizing, and if yes, then why? Inaccurate reference
to a historical figure seems problematic for any philosopher who wishes
to be understood coherently by his critical audience. An appeal
to a historical figure carries with it implication of historical records,
and if Nietzsche distorts or abandons these historical facts, then critics
ought to closely question his license to do so.
Nietzsche again discusses Dionysus later in his authorship in Twilight
of the Idols. This developed Dionysus appears consistent with
the god presented in Beyond Good and Evil,
implying that the god’s characterization remains contrary to its
initial presentation in The Birth of Tragedy. The
following examines Dionysus from the information given in Twilight
of the Idols, an examination leading to the issue of Nietzsche’s
free interpretation with historical data. How can Nietzsche reconcile
his distortion of historical data by arguably synthesizing opposed Dionysian
and Apollinian qualities into one name called Dionysus? In the
chapter “What I Owe to the Ancients” of Twilight of the
Idols, Nietzsche discusses the historical
instance of the Greek worship of Dionysus. The Greeks
worshipped the god through participation in the Dionysian Mysteries:
“For it is only in the Dionysian Mysteries, in the psychology
of the Dionysian state, that the basic fact of the Hellenic instinct
finds expression—its ‘will to life’” (561).
The basic fact of the instinct of the ancient Greek man is his will
to life, and Dionysus affirms life. Even Greek tragedy with its
gruesome accounts of characters’ fates affirms life in a Dionysian
way. The Dionysian Greek acknowledges the tragedy of life and
still says “Yes” to life: “the will to life rejoicing
over its own inexhaustibility” (TI 562). In the face of
both tragedy and joy, Dionysus embraces the “inexhaustibility,”
or endlessness of life. Orgiastic action in the Dionysian Mysteries
affirms life, the Hellene guarantees himself eternal life, “the
eternal return of life; the future promised and hallowed in the past;
the triumphant Yes to life beyond all death and change; true life as
the over-all continuation of life through procreation, through the mysteries
of sexuality” (TI 561). Orgiastic feasts in the Dionysian
Mysteries were an expression of affirmation for the Dionysian man, and
according to Nietzsche, it was not only the sexual actions that were
an expression of Dionysian life-affirmation, but all aspects of procreation
including the pregnancy and the childbirth with all of its pain.
The summation of these events “aroused the highest and most solemn
feelings” within the Dionysian man (TI 561).
Earlier in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche calls the Dionysian
faith the highest faith of all possible faiths. He who believes
in Dionysus “does not negate anymore” (TI 554). Nietzsche
advocates such an affirming mentality, and calls himself: “the
last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus” (TI 563).
The title philosopher, first assigned to the god in Beyond Good and
Evil, signifies change in Nietzsche’s
interpretation of the god since The Birth of Tragedy,
and so one must examine Nietzsche’s intention when applying the
word philosopher to the Greek god Dionysus.
[3] In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche expresses
his understanding of a philosopher’s relationship to the people
s/he addresses warning that the ancients should not be judged according
to the values of Socratic philosophy. He writes, “The Socratic
virtues were preached because the Greeks had lost them: excitable, timid,
fickle comedians, every one of them, they had a few reasons too many
for having morals preached to them” (560). The fact that
they lacked these morals is what Nietzsche exalts. He calls Socratic
philosophers “the decadents of Greek culture, the counter-movement
to the ancient,” preaching morals opposed to the norm of Greek
culture (TI 559). Perhaps Nietzsche calls Dionysus a philosopher
in this counter-cultural sense of the word. The frenzied and sexual
Dionysus has been named a philosopher by Nietzsche, because of his would-be
decadence in Nietzsche’s day. The Dionysian mentality
opposes the conventional lifestyle of Nietzsche’s day, in
which upstanding morality is highly valued and pursued. Dionysian
frenzy, in the historical, Birth of Tragedy sense, would be shunned.
So this is how Dionysus is Nietzsche’s philosopher, the decadent
Dionysus is counter-cultural to the moral values of Nietzsche’s
time. Nietzsche learns values for which to live not from his day,
but from his ancient philosopher, Dionysus. The question remains
for Nietzsche’s thought, who exactly is this Dionysus character—the
historical one Nietzsche first presents, or the synthetic one of rival
forces Nietzsche later presents?
Other people address Nietzsche’s changing presentation of Dionysus,
including Adrian Del Caro, author of “Nietzschean self-transformation
and the transformation of the Dionysian.” His article’s
project confirms the title, changes in Dionysus parallel change in Nietzsche
himself, most clearly manifested when Nietzsche calls Dionysus a philosopher.
Del Caro writes:
Only as Nietzsche transformed himself was he able
to transform the Dionysian. Thus for instance his portrayal of
himself as the first disciple of a philosophical Dionysus had to wait
until he had become a philosopher, and similarly Dionysus only becomes
a philosopher as an act of Nietzsche’s volition. (75)
According to Del Caro, as Nietzsche himself develops
into a philosopher from a philologist, his Dionysus develops into a
philosopher from a Greek god. Del Caro, who supports Nietzsche’s
controversial use of history, introduces views opposing Nietzsche’s
historical interpretations. Although Del Caro and these other
critics disagree about the issue of Nietzsche’s use of history,
they all confirm the occurrence of significant change in Dionysus.
The problem remains that Nietzsche’s use of the name Dionysus
is not historically accurate to the cult of Dionysus. Del Caro
writes:
Kerenyi goes on to quote Karl Jaspers, who wrote that
Nietzsche did not wish to understand the myth of Dionysus, but instead
wished to identify a symbol that would serve him in his philosophizing;
Nietzsche’s Dionysus is therefore otherwise than the myth, and
basically this transformed Dionysus does not assume shape, according
to Jaspers. (72)
Disagreement rests in the
identity or “shape” of the Nietzschean Dionysus. Although
Jaspers claims the Nietzschean Dionysus has no shape, Del Caro disagrees,
asserting that this Dionysus prominently and consistently represents
life-affirmation. However, the feuding critics do concur that
Nietzsche’s Dionysus is, or becomes, a “deviation from the
antique sources” (Del Caro 72). Critics are left to argue
about the freedom that can be allotted to Nietzsche in his discussion
of historical figures while maintaining philosophical coherence, a debate
requiring examination of Nietzsche’s expressed standards of history.
IV.
The Approaches to History
Nietzsche does not
call Dionysus a philosopher in The Birth of Tragedy; yet, Dionysus becomes a philosopher in Beyond
Good and Evil, and continues to
be so in Twilight of the Idols. This variation of
the god’s identity raises an issue for Nietzsche concerning his
use and possible abuse of history. Because he has taken license
to alter the depiction of Dionysus throughout the succession of his
authorship, he arguably exploits historical data for his own philosophical
purposes. [4]
Is he justified in doing this with history, specifically, exploiting
the historical figure, Dionysus? The concept of Dionysus changes
with Nietzsche’s thought, but the name remains the same.
Nietzsche outlines his standards of historical manipulation for the
sake of philosophy in his essay, The Use and Abuse of History.
In this text, he establishes three approaches to the use of history:
the unhistorical, historical, and super-historical. The unhistorical
and historical approaches oppose one another, as their titles might
suggest, and the super-historical, in essence, maximizes man’s
cultural capabilities. The person utilizing the unhistorical approach
completely ignores history, to the extent that s/he has no memory of
the past. The person utilizing the historical approach delves
deeply into the study of history, detail by detail, and is constantly
absorbed in thoughts about the past. The person utilizing the
super-historical approach selects and studies only the historical events
that may encourage him to improve his own culture. This approach
is most significant for my argument because Nietzsche attempts to enact
it, since it is most conducive to the promotion of great culture.
The standards of the super-historical approach (set up by Nietzsche)
are the standards that he must follow. I will first clarify and
contrast the unhistorical and historical approaches to history, and
then articulate the super-historical method in order to investigate
Nietzsche’s adherence to this method.
The historical disposition essentially studies past events in comprehensive,
sequential detail, and the unhistorical disposition completely neglects
and forgets the past. In The Use and Abuse of History,
Nietzsche illustrates the unhistorical perspective by comparing
man and beast. Man envies the beast, because the beast, in its
unhistorical disposition, forgets the past, and lives in ignorant bliss
during the present moment (UAH 5). The past constantly haunts
and absorbs man, to the extent that his existence is “an imperfect
tense that never becomes a present” (UAH 6). Man’s
attempts to completely resist and overcome the past are in vain, and
these futile attempts also inhibit him from fulfilling his life in the
present moment. The Use and Abuse of History presents ways
that the reader can best combat his human inability to resist and overcome
the past, using his knowledge and awareness of the past as an advantage
rather than a hindrance. Man cannot completely and continually
persist in this unhistorical perspective, because he has the capability
and disposition to remember his past. Man can, however, be temporarily
unhistorical, or forgetful of the past, which, in turn, promotes creativity.
The unhistorical or “anti-historical” condition is necessary
for action and change in the present and “is the cradle not only
of unjust action, but of every just and justifiable action in the world”
(UAH 9). Man forgets and neglects his past so that he may be active
and creative in the present: “No artist will paint his picture,
no general win his victory, no nation gain its freedom, without having
striven and yearned for it under those very ‘unhistorical’
conditions” (UAH 9). The unhistorical forgetfulness of the
past enables creativity of great men, which contributes to the maintenance
and success of a culture. The contrasting historical perspective
is also necessary to the upholding of a culture: “This is the
point that the reader is asked to consider: that the unhistorical and
the historical are equally necessary to the health of an individual,
a community, and a system of culture” (UAH 8). Thus, Nietzsche
launches the historical approach.
The historical approach is a detailed, informative, and traditional
academic account of history. The benefits of such a strict approach
include knowledge of a comprehensive, chronological account of history,
which in turn can inform man of great cultures of past, that he may
learn from their triumph. Excess interest in history can, however,
be detrimental to a community or culture. The danger lies in the
fact that “the time comes to imagine that [a particular time in
history] possesses the rarest of virtues, justice, to a higher degree
than other time,” which in turn might presuppose a negation or
resentment of the present by its people (UAH 28). Resentment of
the present surfaces when admiration of the past presumes that the present
culture is inferior and incapable of victory over its past. To
maximize history’s benefits and uses for greatness, it should
be written only by people of experience and character, for those who
have experienced what is “great and noble” are able to write
about what is great and noble (UAH 41). Nietzsche alludes to man’s
perspective; the perspective of a particular historian affects the stories
revealed to the future. Nietzsche strongly opposes rigid, objective
accounts of history, because they will inevitably fail in their objectivity.
The example of studying religion historically illustrates Nietzsche’s
aversion to strict and rigid historical accounts:
A religion, for example, that has to be turned into
a matter of historical knowledge by the power of pure justice, and to
be scientifically studied throughout, is destroyed at the end of it
all. For the historical audit brings so much to light which is
false and absurd, violent and inhuman, that the condition of pious illusion
falls to pieces. And a thing can only live through a pious illusion.
(UAH 42)
Nietzsche emphasizes that rigid, historical study of
religion deadens it. The historical approach brings falsity and
absurdity to light making the mystical aspects of religion unbelievable.
That is, perhaps from a historical perspective, the mystery and faith
of a religion seem absurd. Powerful, believed religion, illusory
as it may be, loses its strength when it is examined objectively and
historically. Nietzsche claims that religion must be lived, and
not studied, in order to persevere. History, or historical presentation,
should never be honored above life (UAH 44). And when one studies
religion for the sake of history and not for the sake of discipleship,
it dies. So one must be cautious when studying history for benefit,
that he does not do so in objective excess, because objective, historical
excess brings about numbness of the present life.
After discussing the historical and unhistorical conditions,
Nietzsche presents the idea of the “super-historical” man,
who views the world completely accomplished, fulfilling its “aim”
at every minute (10). Unlike the historical man, the super-historical
man thinks that “the past and the present are one and the same”
(11). The super-historical man does not study history for the
sake of history, but with the intention to fulfill his life, exclaiming
with Nietzsche: “If we could only learn better to study history
as a means to life!” (UAH 11) History can be studied as
a means to life for the super-historical “man of action”
who needs “examples, teachers, and comforters,” which he
cannot find among his contemporaries (UAH 12). Such is the super-historical
man’s use for history, to extract exalted examples and teachers
so that he may enhance his current culture. The super-historical
man picks and chooses the instances of history that may benefit him,
and he “un-historically” neglects the study of events that
do not help to clarify his esteemed historical example. Nietzsche
expresses the super-historical man’s handling of history:
Man must have the strength to break up the past, and
apply it too, in order to live. He must bring the past to the
bar of judgment, interrogate it remorselessly, and finally condemn it.
Every past is worth condemning; this is the rule in mortal affairs,
which always contain a large measure of human power and human weakness.
(UAH 20-21)
This passage addresses man’s realization of his
own potential greatness. He must condemn the past and all of its
horrors so that he may be productively more powerful than those who
were before him. Man cannot completely escape the past from which
he sprang, acknowledging its error, horror and injustice, but man can
promote a more powerful form of life: “We plant a new way of life,
a new instinct, a second nature, that withers the first” (UAH
21). Knowledge informs man of the errors of his past, and so there
is optimistic hope for the man of action, that he may “plant a
new way of life,” which is greater than his past. The super-historical
approach to history compels one to select historical events that inspire
human and cultural strength, and to overlook historical events that
fail to do so.
Nietzsche recaps his overarching project of The Use and Abuse of
History, to track down “the dangers of history” and
expose them to the reader, encouraging man to approach history super-historically
(65). History should be man’s servant, and written from
the viewpoint of great people rather than from the viewpoint of the
masses (UAH 61/65). Nietzsche reminds the reader of the “super-historical”
power of the self, which realizes “the eternal and stable character”
of present existence, and does not obsess over past events (UAH 69).
The super-historical self lives completely in the present, viewing the
world as complete in each present moment, and such a characteristic
is necessary for the religious man of greatness as well. Flourishing
religion, according to Nietzsche’s standards, must be believed
in the present moment to survive and to produce greatness in people.
If the religion is viewed as temporarily passing through history, it
will significantly fail to affect its followers’ lives.
The three approaches to history, exemplified by a preferred approach
to religion, spins the discussion back to examination of Nietzsche’s
philosopher-god, Dionysus.
V.
Investigating Nietzsche’s Adherence to His Own Principles
To test Nietzsche’s philosophical approaches
to history charitably and justly, I will apply his historical standards
to his controversial presentation of Dionysus, investigating his abiding
by his own historical principles throughout his liberal interpretation
of the Greek god. Presumably, Nietzsche would intend to present
Dionysus in a super-historical manner, because he deems this approach
superior to the others. I will, however, speedily prove this assumption
by systematically applying the unhistorical, historical, and super-historical
approaches to Nietzsche’s portrayal of Dionysus, quickly eliminating
the first two approaches, leaving the reader to examine the standards
of the super-historical approach, interrogating Nietzsche’s possible
violation of his own principles. The unhistorical approach to
Dionysus would be complete neglect of historical facts known about the
worship of Dionysus. Nietzsche does not adopt the unhistorical
approach to history, because, in The Birth of Tragedy, he accurately
depicts Dionysus as a Greek god of music, who was worshipped in the
Dionysian Mysteries and Festivals, in which orgiastic and drunken frenzy
occurred. Nietzsche’s conveying this information indicates
acknowledgment of historical records; thus, Nietzsche arguably approaches
Dionysus historically, to a certain degree. However, I have shown
that Nietzsche’s presentation of Dionysus changes throughout the
sequence of his authorship, specifically in Beyond Good and Evil and Twilight of the Idols. Therefore,
Nietzsche does not utilize the historical approach exclusively and continually
with Dionysus. If he were using the historical approach exclusively
and continually, then Dionysus would have never evolved into the philosopher-god
that synthesizes Apollinian and Dionysian qualities, as shown in Beyond
Good and Evil. Dionysus would have remained the frenzied,
historically accurate god that Nietzsche introduces in The Birth
of Tragedy if Nietzsche had strictly appealed to the historical
approach. So, Nietzsche does not strictly implement the unhistorical
approach, he alludes to the past in his reference to the Greek god of
music in The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche does not, however,
strictly implement the historical approach either, he creatively alters
the god’s identity, calling him a philosopher god that synthesizes
genuine Apollinian and Dionysian characteristics.
[5] Since the unhistorical and historical approaches have
been dismissed, I will investigate the super-historical approach and
Nietzsche’s execution of it.
The super-historical approach remains the last option Nietzsche
might have enacted during his creative, philosophical discussion of
Dionysus. This approach utilizes the historical approach to a
limited degree and then overcomes it. The super-historical man
extracts “examples, teachers, and comforters” from history,
which he cannot find among his contemporaries, to inspire improvement
and enrichment for his life and culture (UAH 12). He strives to
conquer these examples, establishing himself superior to what has past
before him. The super-historical man acts historically in his
selection of inspiring events by which to live and then conquer.
Then, his victory of the particular historical instance is an un-historical
effort, creating newness and affirming the importance and value of the
present time over what has past. The defeat of history creates
anew, enabling man to un-historically forget the past. Nietzsche
attempts to enact this approach to history, and I will question if he
actually does so with his philosophical use of Dionysus.
With the aid of Walter Kaufmann’s work, I will apply Nietzsche’s
own super-historical approach to his developing presentation of Dionysus,
testing the consistency of that presentation using his invented super-historical
standard. Kaufmann articulates Nietzsche’s super-historical
approach to Dionysus in his book, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist,
Antichrist. He claims that all of Nietzsche’s works
view history super-historically (152). He quotes Nietzsche’s
explanation of humanity’s goal concerning its treatment of history:
“The goal of humanity cannot lie in the end but only in its highest
specimens” (149). Nietzsche has brought to life the linear
concept of history versus a concept of history above and beyond time
sequences. The “highest specimens” of creation might
have occurred at any point in time, and humanity’s goal is to
achieve, emulate, and conquer, becoming greater and more cultured than
what has already been. Nietzsche disregards the historical value
of progress by comparing his own culture with the mighty Greeks, as
Kaufmann articulates:
Being primarily interested in art and philosophy,
Nietzsche found that asking the mere question amounted to a condemnation
of his contemporaries and a repudiation of any belief that history is
a story of progress. (150)
Nietzsche thought his contemporaries
were not equal to the great ones of past, and concluded “what
comes later in time is not necessarily more valuable” (Kaufmann
150). In this approach, there is no regard to history as a course
of events; rather, there is an exclusive emphasis on its great acts,
which are to be emulated and conquered (or overcome) by man for the
benefit his culture. Kaufmann concludes that all of Nietzsche’s
works including his first, The Birth of Tragedy, view history supra-historically and that his motivation
was to intensify history into symbolic significance and not to recount
it with strict historical accuracy (152).
Nietzsche consciously attempts to enforce the super-historical
approach, because the other two approaches are not entirely applicable
to his presentation of Dionysus, as my examination has shown. The super-historical
approach to history allows the philosopher to assess history and abstract
only the slices of actual instances that motivate him to strengthen
his culture. In other words, the super-historical approach permits
man to neglect the insignificant details of a historical instance, and
enact those details that aid his aspiration for greatness. In
accordance with this principle, Nietzsche neglects to describe every
historical detail of the worship of Dionysus, but the question remains,
what historically accurate details of Dionysus does he offer?
Because Nietzsche’s Dionysus changes, I will refer to his latest
form presented in Twilight of the Idols throughout this inquiry;
it exemplifies Nietzsche’s most developed and perfected thought.
I ask how the super-historical approach allows Nietzsche to use historical
instances, ultimately determining that Nietzsche fails to comply with
his standards, which weakens his recommendation to follow Dionysus and
destroys his historical justification to provide ideals from actual
instances.
The description of Dionysus in Twilight of the Idols is
a distortion of the god’s historical identity. Nietzsche’s
blend of Apollinian and Dionysian characteristics into one name “Dionysus,”
first expressed in the cited passage of Beyond Good and Evil
then carried over to Twilight of the Idols,
alters the historically depicted god in The Birth of Tragedy.
According to historical scholarship, Dionysus was not worshipped as
a god made up of both Apollinian and Dionysian qualities. Dionysus
was Dionysus and Apollo was Apollo: these gods were separate.
Nietzsche’s synthesis of the opposed gods in The Birth of Tragedy
is historically unfounded. His controversial move in Beyond
Good and Evil violates his invented super-historical standards because
of its historical inaccuracy. The super-historical approach allows
man to extract actual instances of history, neglecting insignificant
details; the approach does not however allow alteration of actual events
by Nietzsche’s own super-historical standards. His interpretative
use of Dionysus is problematic because it violates his own super-historical
standards, but it also creates another issue for his project’s
plea to history. Throughout his authorship, Nietzsche clearly
indicates esteem of the Greek culture, telling his readers that this
valuable culture can be emulated and even defeated; yet, according to
his fictional Dionysus, this culture possibly did not even exist in
actuality, as he represents it, which causes the readers to question
the credibility of Nietzsche’s recommendations to achieve great
culture.
Del Caro offers a defense of Nietzsche’s approach, which might
save him from such a dismissal due to his historical inaccuracy.
He associates changes in the representation of Dionysus with changes
in Nietzsche himself, expressing Nietzsche’s philosophical reinterpretations
of Dionysus: “The language along with the issues change, but the
Dionysian undercurrent remains as the sustaining matrix of the philosophy
of life-affirmation” (70). Del Caro justifies Nietzsche’s
debatable use of Dionysus, claiming that the representation consistently
projects the philosophy of life-affirmation. Del Caro describes
Nietzsche’s historical inaccuracy, claiming he has no use for
a mythical, cultic Dionysus; rather, Nietzsche becomes a disciple of
the philosopher god Dionysus. He does not devote himself to the
religion and cult of Dionysus, but to the philosophy of Dionysus:
“Nietzsche was not concerned with remaining faithful to sources
in the Dionysian religion, but had his own philosophical agenda instead”
(Del Caro 75). [6]
This argument defends Nietzsche’s use of Dionysus but fails to
admit Nietzsche’s problems. The philosopher god serves a
conceptual purpose to encourage life-affirmation, as Del Caro would
agree, but this conceptual functioning of Dionysus does not resolve
the fact that Nietzsche distorts the god and fails to follow his own
super-historical standards by wedding him to Apollo. Del Caro
never addresses the super-historical approach to history, the standards
of which expose Nietzsche’s problem of historical inaccuracy.
Nietzsche’s super-historical approach allows him to extract and
exalt historical figures of valuable significance, but the figures,
or their worship, must be factually founded according to the principles
of the super-historical approach, which, in theory, prohibits Nietzsche
from creating fictional figures and claiming their historical existence
or worship, as he has done with Dionysus.
VI.
Conclusion
Nietzsche’s super-historical attempt at depicting
Dionysus fails due to his fabrication of the god. Indeed, Nietzsche
may enforce a philosophy of life-affirmation, but his distortion of
history is unjustified, even by his own super-historical rules.
Therefore, Nietzsche weakens his plea to join in the discipleship of
Dionysus, because his creative depiction of the god fails by his own
standards. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s effort to provide ideal
examples from history is futile when his extractions of historical instances
are historically inaccurate or unfounded, as demonstrated in the case
of Dionysus.
Perhaps Nietzsche advocates his distortion of history in a desperate
endeavor to be more like the Greeks. In The Use and Abuse of
History, Nietzsche compares his fellow men to the Greeks, claiming
that the Germans of his day face a challenge similar to what the ancients
experienced and overcame. He writes, “German culture and
religion is at present a death struggle of all foreign nations and bygone
times” (UAH 72). The German culture is in potential danger
of being overcome by its past and will slip passively through history
unnoticed because of their failure to revolutionize culture. According
to Nietzsche, the Greeks overcame such a struggle through strength from
their religious influence, and perhaps Nietzsche hopes his culture will
do the same, finding strength in his original construction of Dionysus.
However, Nietzsche’s appeal to Greek culture as a model for all
cultures requires accurate citation of this Golden Age; otherwise, the
project is fiction-based, concluding that his appeals to history cannot
be taken earnestly.
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